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PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO: TIIIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS TREASURE VALLEY AREA 
NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS and NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS LITERATURE'S MOTION .FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT I Page 1 of 11 
?JORIGINAL 
Plaintiff Simona objects to Third Party Defendants' 10 July 2014 MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT as follows: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff Donna Simona ("Simono") seeks to recover damages from Defendants 
Larry Rogers, Cheryl Barker, and Turner House ("Turner House) and Third Party 
Defendants Treasure Valley Area Narcotics Anonymous, and Narcotics Anonymous 
Literature ("Narcotics Anonymous") for injuries she sustained when she fell on a 
darkened flight of stairs at the Turner House premises on the night of 07 January 2013. 
Simo no attended a Narcotics Anonymous meeting that was held on the on the 
third floor of Turner House. When she left the meeting, she descended the stairs. 
(Complaint, 111110, 11). There was no working light fixture on the second floor staircase. 
Simona could not see the last two stairs before the mid-way landing. She took a step, 
fell, and seriously injured both ankles. (Complaint, 111112, 13). 
Larry Rogers owns Turner House. (Dep. of Cheryl Barker, p. 17). Rogers was and 
is in the process of remodeling Turner House. Some of the work had begun or had been 
completed, including shops on the first floor, an apartment for Mr. Rogers' use on the 
second floor, and a meeting room for Narcotics Anonymous on the third floor. (Dep. of 
Larry Rogers, p. 11), (Dep. of Cheryl Barker, pp.25, 30). Cheryl Barker is Rogers' sister 
and is the general manager of Turner House for her brother. (Dep. of Cheryl Barker, 
p.6). 
Narcotics Anonymous leases a space on the third floor of Turner House from 
Rogers and Barker in order to hold meetings for its members (Dep. of Bob Foss, p. 8-9). 
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Simono contends that she was an invitee on the premises when she fell. Thus 
Turner House and Narcotics Anonymous owed her a duty to maintain the premises in a 
reasonably safe condition, which included the duty to exercise ordinary care in 
inspecting the premises for the purpose of discovering and remedying hazards, such as 
the inadequate lighting on the stairs. (See Complaint, 111117, 18). 
Narcotics Anonymous contends that, as a matter of law, Simono was only a 
licensee to whom they owed only a limited duty to warn of the hazards on the premises, 
known and unknown to them, and not reasonably discovered by Simono. Turner House 
agrees and contends that Simona should be considered a licensee as to both Narcotics 
Anonymous and Turner House. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Narcotics Anonymous' recitation of the facts omits several details that 
demonstrate that Plaintiff Simono was in fact, an invitee, rather than a licensee on the 
night that she was injured at Turner House. 
1. Bob Foss discussed with Rogers the possibility of renting a room of Turner 
House to hold daily Narcotics Anonymous meetings. Rogers agreed to rent a room to 
Narcotics Anonymous for $120 per month. (Dep. of Bob Foss, pp.24, 25). 
2. On behalf of Turner House, Barker entered into a lease agreement with 
Narcotics Anonymous. Bob Foss signed the lease on behalf of Narcotics Anonymous. 
Foss facilitated and occasionally conducted the Narcotics Anonymous meetings on the 
third floor of Turner House in a semi-remodeled room. (Dep. of Cheryl Barker pp. 34-
38). 
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3. Narcotics Anonymous has held daily meetings for its members on the third 
floor of Turner House since March 2010. (Dep. of Bob Foss, pp.8-11). AB part of the 
lease agreement with Turner House, Narcotics Anonymous agreed to sweep and clean 
up the common areas, maintain the third floor bathroom, replace non-working light 
bulbs, and pay rent each month. (Dep. of Bob Foss, pp.11-13). 
4. Simono attended approximately five Narcotics Anonymous meetings per 
month between February 2011 and 07 January 2013, per court order. (Dep. of Donna 
Simono, pp. 21, 23). 
5. Simono lives in Mountain Home, Idaho. (Dep. of Donna Simono, p. 7). 
Turner House is the only Narcotics Anonymous meeting location in Mountain Home. 
6. At every meeting, a Narcotics Anonymous member routinely passed a 
basket around to solicit monetary donations from the members in attendance. The 
members understood that money collected was used to pay the $120 monthly rent to 
Turner House. There was not a time in which the donations collected were insufficient 
to fully pay the rent to Turner House. (Dep. of Bob Foss, pp.21, 26, 27). 
7. On the night of 07 January 2013, Simono attended a Narcotics 
Anonymous meeting at Turner House. (Complaint, 1110). 
8. When she left, Simono descended the stairs. There was no working light 
fixture on the second floor staircase. AB she reached the second floor, Simono could not 
see the last two stairs before the mid-way landing. She took a step and fell. (Complaint, 
111111, 12). 
9. Simono was injured as a result of the fall. (Complaint, 11 13). She 
sustained fractures to her right ankle that required two surgeries. 
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10. The stairway where Simono fell was in a common area of Turner House. 
11. The Turner House second :floor electrical circuit was inoperable. If 
repaired, the circuit would have run power to two different light fixtures on the second 
:floor, one of which was over the stairway. At the time of Simono's fall, neither fixture 
worked due to the inoperable circuit. (Dep. of Larry Rogers, pp. 15-16). 
12. Rogers stated that, "He [electrician hired by Rogers] could have repaired 
that [circuit] months before, but it was just not that important." (Dep. of Larry Rogers, 
p.17). 
13. Rogers and Barker knew that Turner House was being used by the public 
and that members of Narcotics Anonymous attended meetings on the third floor. (Dep. 
of Cheryl Barker, p,59). 
14. Barker thought the lighting on second story stairway was "adequate." She 
stated, "We didn't worry about it." (Dep. of Cheryl Barker, p. 63). The statements of 
Barker and Rogers confirm that providing power to the second story stairway light 
fixture "was just not that important." (Dep. of Larry Rogers, p. 17). 
III. IAW &ARGUMENT 
Narcotics Anonymous and Turner House contend that Simono, as a matter of 
law, was only a licensee at Turner House when she was injured. In support, Narcotics 
Anonymous cites Rehwalt v. American Falls Reservoir, Dist. No. 2, 97 Idaho 634, 636, 
550 P.2d 137,139 (1976); Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535,347 P.2d 341 (1959); and 
Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 400, 871 P.2d 814, 817 (1994). Narcotics 
Anonymous claims that in regards to licensees, the fact that the guest may be rendering 
minor, incidental services to the host does not change the [licensee] relationship, nor is 
the relationship changed by the fact that the guest and the host may have a mutual or 
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common interest in the purpose of the visit, such as the service of a church, lodge, or 
political purpose, or an intangible social benefit to the host, citing Wilson, 81 Idaho at 
545,347 P.2d at 851. 
Narcotics Anonymous' argument fails for two reasons: First, Simono's status 
at Turner House is a question of fact. Holzheimer, supra at 399, 816. Narcotics 
Anonymous' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDMENT contends that 
"undisputed facts prove that Plaintiff Donna Simono was a licensee at the Turner 
House property at the time of the subject accident .... " It then goes on to state, "Based 
upon the pre-trial materials filed by the Plaintiff and Third Party Plaintiffs, the issue 
of Plaintiff's legal status on the property is in contention." The allegation that 
Simo no' s legal status is contested is a genuine issue of fact that precludes summary 
judgment. Second, the law does not support Narcotic's Anonymous position. 
Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 400, 871 P.2d 814, 817 (1994) 
defined an invitee as: 
... one who enters upon the premises of another for a purpose 
connected with the business conducted on the land, or where it can 
reasonably be said that the visit may confer a business, commercial, 
monetary or other tangible benefit upon the landowner. 
IDJI 3.13 refines the definition as follows: 
An invitee is a person who enters upon the premises of another for 
a purpose connected with business there conducted, or whose visit 
may reasonably be said to confer or anticipate a business, 
commercial, monetary or other tangible benefit to the [owner] 
[ occupant]. 
"Invitee" is synonymous with "business visitor." 
The record demonstrates that Simono's presence on the Turner House 
premises conferred an immediate economic benefit to Turner House and to 
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Narcotics Anonymous because her donations helped Narcotics Anonymous pay 
the rent. While the benefit may be indirect, it not necessary that Simona's 
purpose be to enter into immediate business dealings with the possessor the 
land -- in this case, Turner House. The benefit to the possessor may be indirect 
and in the future. Thus, those who enter a shop with no present purpose of 
buying, but merely to look at the goods displayed, are business visitors of the 
shop, and one who comes to a residence merely to inquire about an automobile 
advertised for sale is a business visitor of the possessor. It is not necessary that 
the particular visit shall offer the possibility of business dealings or of benefit to 
the possessor. It is enough that it has reasonable connection with another visit 
which does. Thus one whom comes to return goods purchased and to demand 
his money back is still a business visitor. Restatement (Second) of Torts,§ 332. 
Even if Simono were only a gratuitous licensee of Narcotics Anonymous, 
she would still be a business visitor and invitee of Turner House under § 332. 
Comment k to subsection (3) of that section states: 
Id. 
A person may be a business visitor of a lessor of land although he is 
merely a gratuitous licensee of the lessee. Thus, a lessor of an 
apartment in an apartment house or of an office in an office 
building, who retains the control of the halls, stairways, and other 
approaches to the apartment or office, holds such parts of the 
premises open to any person whom his lessee may choose to admit, 
irrespective of whether the visit of such a person is for his own or 
the lessee's business purpose or whether he comes as a mere social 
guest or other licensee of the tenant. 
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In comparison, comment g to subsection (3) states: 
Id. 
Visits incidental to business relations of possessor and third persons. It is 
not necessary that the visitor shall himself be upon the land for the 
purposes of the possessor's business. The visit may be for the convenience 
or arise out of the necessities of others who are themselves upon the land 
for such a purpose. Thus those who go to a hotel to pay social calls upon 
the guests or to a railway station to meet passengers or bid them farewell, 
are business visitors, since it is part of the business of the hotelkeeper and 
railway to afford the guest and passengers such conveniences. So too, a 
child taken by a mother or nurse to a shop is a business visitor; and this is 
true irrespective of whether it is necessary for the customer to take the 
child with her in order to visit the shop. 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Menard v. Cashman, 94 N.H. 428, 55 
A.2d 156 (1947) found that a landlord had a business interest in the public being able to 
enter his building by a common stairway to visit tenants. A Delaware Court in Hok.sch v. 
Startford Apartments, Inc., 283 A.2d 687,689 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971), held that a 
landlord had a business interest in the ingress and egress of those whom its tenant 
would admit to the premises. 
In this case, there is no genuine issue of fact that Turner House had a business 
interest in having Narcotics anonymous receive meeting attendees. As stated in Hoksch, 
supra at 689: 
It is fair to conjecture that it would be difficult if not impossible for a landlord to 
lease an apartment with the stipulation that the lessee was prohibited from 
inviting any people whatsoever to that apartment, regardless of the purpose of 
the visit. It is obvious that the ability to allow social guests, deliverymen, movers, 
and other such visitors to come to a rented apartment is part of the attractiveness 
of such a place. Without this benefit, the number of a landlord's prospective 
tenants would be greatly diminished. Therefore, I do not believe that it strains 
the imagination to find that an occupier of land maybe benefited by visits from 
those whom he has not expressly invited. 
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In Tomich v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 394, 901 P.2d 501 (1995), the Idaho 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decisions regarding the admission of evidence 
jury instructions characterizing an airplane owner as an invitee. Tomich was the 
owner and pilot of a small airplane that was destroyed in a windstorm at a municipal 
airport due to improper maintenance and failure of tie-downs on the runway. 
The city sought a directed verdict, stating that Tomich was not an invitee. The 
trial court denied the request and instead instructed the jury according to the definition 
of "invitee" found in IDJI 3.13. The city focused on the word "business" and contended 
that Tomich was not an invitee because he used his plane for recreational purposes. See 
Tomich, at 127 Idaho at 399,901 P.2d at 506. 
The Supreme Court held that because Tomich used the airport to fly his plane, 
which is the "business there conducted" at an airport, he was therefore an invitee. The 
fact that an individual has a personal or recreational reason for entering the premises of 
another is irrelevant to whether that individual meets the definition of an invitee. The 
relevant inquiry is whether the individual enters the premises for a purpose connected 
with the business conducted on those premises. The Court found that Tomich used the 
airport in exactly the manner for which it was intended, designed, and commonly used, 
thereby benefitting the city. Therefore, Tomich was an invitee. [emphasis added]. See 
Id. 
Simono's purpose for attending Narcotics Anonymous meetings at Turner House 
had a personal component - to receive addiction recovery support from other members 
and to comply with the terms of her court order. However, she attended meetings in the 
space within Turner House that was leased by Narcotics Anonymous for the "purpose 
connected with Narcotics Anonymous' business conducted at Turner House." Narcotics 
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Anonymous and Turner House both benefitted from Simono's meeting attendance and 
the donations she made, which contributed to the rent. 
The authorities cited support the proposition that not only was Simono not a 
licensee when she fell; she was an invitee as a matter oflaw. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Simono respectfully asserts that her legal status on the Turner House premises 
on 07 January 2013 was that of an invitee. As such, Narcotics Anonymous' MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT should be denied. 
DATED 02, August 2014. 
LAW-IDAHO PLLC 
By: 
Sheli Fulcher Koontz, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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REPLY TO 11IiAl'NT1FF'S OBJECTION TO THIRD PAR.TY DEFENDANT'S MO'rION 
f.'OR PAR'rJAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT~ 1 
I. M01~I0N TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION 
Third Party Detendants (Natcoth:.s Anonymous) filed their motion for partial summary 
judsment on July 9, 2014. Narcot.i.cs Anonymous then med a notice of hearing on July 10, 2014~ 
noticl.ng this hearing fbr August l 8. 2014. Plain ti ff fl led her object.ion and suppot'ting dc)()Unlents Otl 
August s. 2014. 
Pursuant to IRC.P S6( c), an adverse party ls required to file a responsive brief and afiidavits no 
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fbr the late fillng, Narcotics Anonymous. therefore, requests that this Cout't strike Plaintiff's 
Ob.)ec:Oon tt>! Third Party Defendants Treasure VaUey Area Narcotics Anonymous&. Narcotiea 
Anonymous Llteratwe+ s Motlon for Partial Summ,ary Judgment (Objection) and supporting atlldavit. 
II. REPLY TO PLAIN'rlFF•s ()BJECTION 
In the event, this Court allows Plaintiff to nutintaln her t.1bjt,ction~ N~ln.'Otics Anonymous 
replies to that objection. as follows: 
A. All Relevant Factl aI"e Undb1puted 
The relev.mt facts we.re set forth in Nmcotics Aoonymous•s initial briefing. Neither Plaintiff 
nor Third 'Party Plaindff' s (Turner House) disagreed with the tacts irtS set furth therein. PJnirrdff did 
recite some additional ftcts in ber ob.}ection. For purposes of the motion .fhr pmttal .su.n1mm1 
Judgment* Narcotics An.<)nyinous will not dispute the facts recited by Plaintiff. The fBCts related by 
Plalntiff if tilken as being true ahm prove u a matter of law that Ptaintif'f\vu ts H~ensee as to Narcotics 
RltPLV TO PLAlN~rutF'S OBJECTION 'r() TliJR.D l'.ARTV DEFENIJANT~s MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMAR.Y JUDGMENT .. 2 
Anonym.ous on the 1,ight she aUegedly tell. 
B. LepJ. Analyses 
'The law and facts show that J>lnintiff was a liceniee. Narcotics Anonymous is not a 
bu1i1iness. Narcotics Ancmymous does. not sell anything or provide any commercial aervke, 
Narcotics Anon)mout is ii gathering of persons who wish t:o overcome iu:!dictlve behaviors. 
I" '+Ir 
Plruntiff attempts to ct'eate a connnerolal a.,pect ofNa.rcotics Anonymous due to the fact that 
Narcotics Anonymous gives its mctnhers the opportunity to donate to Narcotics Anonymous, The 
sole fact that Narcotics Anonymous allows its members to donate money to the organi1.at:ion does not 
m:akc it a busines$. This would go dlrecdy contrary to holding of the Idaho Supreme Court sta.ting 
i:hat, "The fact that the guest may be rendering minor. incidental service to the host does not change 
the relationship. [Citatioru. omitted.) Nor is the relationship ohanged by the fact that the guest and the 
ht1st may have a mutual or comm,)11 lntemt in the purpose of the visit suoh as the service of a church, 
lodge. or political purpose, or an intangible social benefit to the host. [Citations omitted.)'' Wll~·on v. 
Bogert, 81 Idah.o .S3S, 545,347 :P,2d .341~ 351 (l9S9). The exijn,ples named by the Idaho Supreme 
Court of non .. business relath:mships arc instructive in this case. 
The Court sin.gled out churohtai lodges or politico.I gatherings, lfthe Phdndffwas correct 
d1at request for d()natkms i-endtared an entity a business, then every .. ~htir<:h, lodge or political 
organization would be co1iside1'ed a business entity. AU persona attending a church, lodge or 
i,t,Utical ga.thering would be considered bush1ees visitors. Plaintiff is essentially argu.ing to change 
the definition of an invitee to being any pemon who bestows any mm,eta.ey benet1t ·t(p(ltt tho person 
whti they are visiting. Plaintifrs arguments1 therefore, would lead this Court tc) rule contrary to 
estabUshed precedent. 
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Plaint!tf c,ites T(1mtch ,,. CUyqf Poculello, 127 Idaho 394,901 P.2d sot (t995) hu,•upport of 
her position that she was an invitee. A review of the holding set fo11h in Tomh.,h sho\W that it 
suppo.iu Narnotfo.s Anonymous' a poi&:ition that Plaintiff was a Ucensee. 1'he Court stated: 
The trlat court oorreetly in$tructed the jury th.at Tomfoh was M. invitee. Tomi oh used 
the airport to fly his plane, which is the 0 bmin4,.k$S there ccmducted\" at an airport. and there.fore 
Tomich was 111 invitee. 1'he fact th.at atl individual has a. perscmat or reci•earlona1 reason for 
c..~tering the premises of another .Is irrelevant to whether that h'tdividuw meets the definition ,1f . 
an invl•. Tlie relevant lnqai,y II whether the lndl1;ldu«l ewtm the premls,sfo, a 
p11,p,n1 conn'1.cted with the IHui11a1 c,'>nduct1d on thon premhei, Tomich used the 
airport in exactly the manner for which it w~s intended, designed and commonly i,sed, 
thereby benefldnri the eity. Therethr; Ton\ich was an invitee, 
Tamtclt, 12:7 fdtiho at 399, 901 P.2d at 506. The key word in this holding ls "builness'*. N~otics 
Ancm:ymous is not a "business". Nmtltics Anonymous does not conduct "'business~' at the Tu1·r1er 
House. Since Nw-cotics Anonymous does not conduct "busine!s'~ at the Tumer House. it ·would be 
imi,ossiblc for Plaintiff to attend a N~eotics Anonymous meeting at the Turner House fur a purpose 
oonnected with "business" conducted by Narcotics Anonymous. 
Plaintiff' rnAy !u·gue that NQ!'Codcs Anonymous iJ a business simply because it pays Mnt for 
apac,: in the Tumor House to have a meeting. Pollowing that reasoning, any family that 1-ents a house 
to live in would be a business and soohd guests woutd be invitees. This would essentiaHy eliminate 
the ct:regory of licensees. 
The undi1puted facts in this mattt.r prove that Plaintiff' wns a licensee as to Nw-cotfos 
A sig,:dflcru1t portion of'Plaintifrs objecdott is focused on arguing ihat Plaintiff was an lnvitt"e 
of Turner House. 'fhese arguments are outside of Narcotics A11onymous' s motion for partial 
1ummary judg»'lent iuid only ir1vulve the relationship be:twi-en Turner House and Plaint.Ht Should 
this Cnurt entertain these arguments at the hearlng on August 18, 20 l 4i then Narcotics Anonymous 
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reserves the right to address them at that tlme. 
UI. CONCLUSION 
should be stricken. 
'rhe Plaintiff's own evidence proves that Ntirootics A11011ymou, was not conducting iu1y 
butdness at rum.er House and that Plaintiff\vas 11t,t coming to the Narootics Aonymous meeting tor 
any business purpose, 11,erefore .• Ntll'COtics Anonymous only ,-,wed Phdntiffthe duty ow'ed to a 
licensee,, 
~ DATED this .1.1_ day of August, 2014, 
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Third-Party Defendants Treasure Valley Area of Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics 
Anonymous Literature's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment came before the Court for oral 
argument on August 18, 2014. 
Appearnnces: 
Sheli Fulcher Koontz for Plaintiff 
Stanley J. Tharp for Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs 
Ryan B. Peck for Third-Party Defendants 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The facts in this case have been set forth in prior decisions of this Court1, and will not be 
repeated at length here. In summary, Plaintiff claims she was injured falling on stairs in Turner 
House after attending a Narcotics Anonymous meeting organized by Third-Party Defendants. 
Plaintiff brought a claim for negligence (among other claims) against Defendants. On July 16, 
2014, a pretrial conference was held in this matter. Due to a conflict with another scheduled trial 
with priority, the Court vacated the trial. However, prior to the pretrial conference, the parties 
had submitted proposed jury instructions, which included instructions related to Plaintiffs 
negligence/premises liability claims. Both Plaintiff and Third-Party Plaintiffs/Defendants 
submitted instructions on Plaintiff's status at the time she was visiting Turner House for the 
Narcotics Anonymous meeting on January 7, 2013.2 Third-Party Defendants have moved for 
partial summary judgment asking the Court to determine that Plaintiff was not an invitee at the 
time of the injury, but was instead a licensee.3 
Third-Party Defendants filed their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on July 10, 
2014, along with an affidavit of counsel.4 Third-Party Plaintiffs/Defendants filed a response on 
Aug. 5, 2014, in which they joined with Third-Party Defendants' arguments, also contending that 
Plaintiff should be considered a licensee with regard to them as well as to Third-Party 
Defendants. 5 
See Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Narcotics Anonymous' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed Mar. 20, 2014. 
2 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed July 10, 2014, p. 2. 
3 Id., p. 3. 
4 Second Affidavit of Ryan B. Peck, filed Jul. 10, 2014. 
5 Third-Party Plaintiffs' Response to Third-Party Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 
Aug. 5, 2014, p. 2. 
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Plaintiff filed an objection to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Aug. 11, 
20146 with an affidavit of counsel.7 Plaintiff contends that at the time of her visit to Turner 
House, she was not a licensee, but instead was an invitee a matter of " 8 Though 
Plaintiff's objection was filed Aug. 11 2014, it was signed and allegedly served by fax to the 
other parties on Aug. 8, 2014.9 
Third-Party Defendants filed a Reply on Aug. 11, 2014.10 Contained in this Reply is an 
argument that the Court should strike Plaintiff's objection and affidavits, as they were untimely 
filed and served.11 No motion to shorten time to hear the Motion to Strike was filed, nor was the 
Motion to Strike noticed for hearing. Plaintiffs counsel, E. Lee Shlender, filed two affidavits on 
Aug. 14, 2014 explaining why the Plaintiffs responsive briefs were late and further indicating 
that Plaintiff has no objection to resetting the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment.12 
The Court has considered the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Objection, the 
Reply, and all supporting documents filed with the Court. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Summary judgment is an appropriate remedy if the nonmoving party's "pleadings, 
affidavits, and discovery documents ... , read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476, 50 P.3d 488, 491 (2002) 
(quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)). The court must construe the evidence liberally and draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Hei v. Holzer, 139 Idaho 81, 84-85, 73 P.3d 94, 97-
98 (2003). If the facts, with inferences favorable to the nonmoving party, are such that 
6 Plaintiff's Objection to: Third Party Defendants Treasure Valley Area Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics 
Anonymous Literature's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed Aug. 11, 2014. 
7 Affidavit of Shell Fulcher Koontz in Support of Plaintiff's Objection to: Third Party Defendants Treasure 
Valley Area Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous Literature's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
filed Aug. 11, 2014. 
8 Plaintiff's Objection to: Third Party Defendants Treasure Valley Area Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics 
Anonymous Literature's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed Aug. 11, 2014, p. 10. 
9 Id., p. 11. 
10 Reply to Plaintiff's Objection to Third Party Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
Motion to Strike the Plaintiff's Objection, filed Aug. 11, 2014. 
11 Id., p. 2. 
12 Affidavit of E. Lee Shlender Regarding: Additional Time to File Objection and Affidavit Regarding Third 
Party- Defendant's [sic] Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed Aug. 14, 2014; Affidavit of E. Lee Shlender 
Regarding: Additional Time to File Objection and Affidavit re: Third Party-Defendant's [sic] Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, filed Aug. 14, 2014. 
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reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions, summary judgment is not available. 
Hayward v. Jack's Pharmacy Inc., 141 Idaho 622,625, 115 P.3d 713, 716 (2005). 
The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with sufficient 
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. Id. When the nonmoving party bears the 
burden of proving an element at trial, the moving party may establish a lack of genuine issue of 
material fact by establishing the lack of evidence supporting the element. See Sanders v. Kuna 
Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (1994). "Such an absence of evidence 
may be established either by an affirmative showing with the moving party's own evidence or by 
a review of all the nonmoving party's evidence and the contention that such proof of an element 
is lacking." Id. at fn. 2. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment "may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response ... must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56(e). Such evidence may 
consist of affidavits or depositions, but "the Court will consider only that material ... which is 
based upon personal knowledge and which would be admissible at trial." Harris v. State, Dep 't 
of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 297-98, 847 P.2d 1156, 1158-59 (1992). If the evidence 
reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of law remains on which the 
court may then enter summary judgment as a matter of law. Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 
138 Idaho 443,445, 65 P.3d 184, 186 (2003). 
ANALYSIS 
A. Motion to Strike 
Third-Party Defendants filed a document titled "Reply to Plaintiffs Objection to Third 
Party Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike the Plaintiffs 
Objection." In this document, Third-Party Defendants ask the Court to disregard Plaintiff's 
Objection filed on Aug. 11, 2014, as it was untimely.13 Third-Party Defendants argue because the 
hearing for the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was scheduled for August 18, 2014, the 
Plaintiffs responsive briefmg was due 14 days before the hearing, or August 4, 2014. See 
I.R.C.P. 56(c). Plaintiff instead faxed the responsive briefing to opposing parties on Aug. 8, 
2014, which is untimely under the rule. 
13 Id.,p. 2. 
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There are several reasons why the Court will not address this motion.14 First, Third-Party 
Defendants never noticed the motion for hearing. The Local Rules for the Fourth Judicial District 
state, all counties this District, only those civil matters which have been scheduled for 
uv,:uu.,;.:. by the clerks as provided by this rule and noticed for hearing pursuant to Rules S(a) and 
7(b), I.R.C.P., will be heard by the court." Local Rule 2.2 (emphasis added). Further, I.R.C.P. 
7(b )(3)(D) states, "If the moving party does not request oral argument upon the motion, and does 
not file a brief within fourteen (14) days, the court may deny such motion without notice if the 
court deems the motion has no merit." The Motion to Strike itself does not indicate that oral 
argument is requested. See I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(C). Even if oral argument were requested, a motion 
such as this must be served at least 14 days prior to the hearing. I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(A). Because the 
Motion to Strike has not been noticed, and no request has been made to the Court to change the 
time limits for hearing the Motion to Strike, the Motion to Strike is itself untimely and improper. 
The Court has no basis upon which to review the motion. 
Second, the motion is combined with a memorandum. While the Rules of Civil Procedure 
do not absolutely prohibit a motion from being combined with a memo, see I.R.C.P. 7(b ), the 
local rules do. Local Rule 8.1 states, "Unless ordered otherwise by the court, each motion and 
response to such motion, other than a routine or uncontested matter, must be accompanied by a 
separate memorandum, not to exceed twenty-five (25) pages, containing all of the reasons and 
points and authorities relied upon by the moving party." In this case, not only is the Motion to 
Strike itself combined with the memorandum, the Motion is combined with the Reply brief for 
the Partial Motion for Summary Judgment. By combining a motion to strike and memo with a 
reply brief on a separate motion, a party risks having the motion to strike be overlooked or 
ignored. Further, it no longer looks to the Court for an application for an order, see I.R.C.P. 
7(b)(l), but instead looks like a request for the Court to disregard evidence. A request to strike 
evidence need not be made by motion. See Hecla Min. Co. v. Star-Morning Min. Co., 122 Idaho 
778, 782-83, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196-97 (1992). However, the current motion is one to strike a 
14 The Court notes that a failure to rule on a motion is deemed to be a denial. See Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 
152 Idaho 673,677, 273 P.3d 1266, 1270 (2012) ("The trial court's failure to rule on the City's motion to strike 
amounts to a denial of that motion.") (citing Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375,380,234 P.3d 699, 
704 (2010)). 
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response and supporting affidavits on untimeliness, and not a request to ignore inadmissible 
evidence. Therefore, a separate motion must be brought and noticed. Since that did not occur in 
case, the Court has no basis for striking the Plaintiff's responsive briefing. 
Finally, even if were to address the Motion to Strike, the Court would deny it 
on the grounds of harmless error. The Supreme Court has stated that untimely affidavits are 
properly stricken. See Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801, 805, 291 P.3d 1000, 1004 
(2012), reh'g denied (June 7, 2012). There is no allegation from Third-Party Defendants that the 
Plaintiff's untimely filings in any way prejudiced Third-Party Defendants from being able to 
respond in a meaningful manner. Absent prejudice, there is no need for a draconian application 
of timing laws. See Ponderosa Paint Mfg., Inc., 125 Idaho at 317, 870 P.2d at 670; McClure 
Eng'g, Inc., v. Channel 5 KIDA, 143 Idaho 950, 955, 155 P.3d 1189, 1194 (Ct. App. 2006). In 
this case, no prejudice was alleged, nor does the Court see how prejudice was caused. Further, 
the Third-Party Defendants adequately replied to the Plaintiff's responsive briefing, and in a 
timely manner. Therefore, the Court, in its discretion, would not strike the Plaintiff's responsive 
briefing as prejudicial. Further, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 61, any error that occurred in late filing was 
harmless. 
B. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
This case includes a negligence claim based on premises liability. Third-Party Defendants 
leased space in Turner House, and in turn, allowed Narcotics Anonymous participants to attend 
I 
meetings in that leased space. Ms. Simono attending those meetings, and was injured. Ms. 
Simono has alleged negligence, which has four elements: "(1) a duty, recognized by law, 
requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) 
a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss 
or damage." Nation v. State, Dep't of Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 189, 158 P.3d 953, 965 (2007). 
In this case, because it is a premises liability case, "duty of owners and possessors of land is 
determined by the status of the person injured on the land (i.e., whether the person is a [sic] 
invitee, licensee or trespasser)." Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 399, 871 P.2d 814, 
816 (1994). The parties dispute whether Ms. Simono was an invitee or licensee at the time of the 
lllJUry. 
In a negligence case, both the Court and the jury have responsibilities in determining 
whether all four elements have been established. "Generally, the question of whether a duty 
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is a question of law." O'Guin v. Bingham Cnty., 142 Idaho 49, 51, 122 P.3d 308, 310 
(2005). Thus, it is not the jury's role to determine whether a duty exists. Instead, the jury 
determines whether a breach of duty caused the plaintiffs damages. All these issues are 
u.1;,c,uu,,.,. of fact. Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 851, 908 P.2d 143, 153 (1995); Davis v. 
McDougall, 94 Idaho 61, 63, 480 P.2d 907, 909 (1971); Hanks v. Sawtelle Rentals, Inc., 133 
Idaho 199, 203, 984 P.2d 122, 126 (1999). Thus, it is arguably the Court's responsibility to 
determine the duty. However, it is not the Court's responsibility to determine what duty exists; 
only "whether a duty exists." In this case, the parties do not dispute that a duty existed. Instead, 
they dispute the level of duty that exists. Therefore, the Court is not being called upon to 
determine whether a duty exists, but what level of duty exists. The level of duty can tum on 
questions of fact. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has given a detailed explanation of duties that arise in premises 
liability cases. 
An invitee is one who enters upon the premises of another for a purpose 
connected with the business conducted on the land, or where it can reasonably be 
said that the visit may confer a business, commercial, monetary or other tangible 
benefit to the landowner. Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535,347 P.2d 341 (1959). A 
landowner owes an invitee the duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe 
condition, or to warn of hidden or concealed dangers. Bates v. Eastern Idaho 
Regional Medical Center, 114 Idaho 252, 253, 755 P.2d 1290, 1291 (1988). A 
licensee is a visitor who goes upon the premises of another with the consent of the 
landowner in pursuit of the visitor's purpose. See Pincock v. McCoy, 48 Idaho 
227, 281 P. 371 (1929); Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400, 732 P.2d 369 
(Ct.App.1987). Likewise, a social guest is also a licensee. Wilson, 81 Idaho at 
545,' 347 P.2d at 347. The duty owed to a licensee is narrow. A landowner is only 
required to share with the licensee knowledge of dangerous conditions or 
activities on the land. Evans, 112 Idaho at 401, 732 P.2d at 370. Additionally, this 
Court has held that "[t]he fact that a guest may be rendering a minor, incidental 
service to the host does not change the relationship [between them as a landowner 
and a licensee]." Wilson, 81 Idaho at 545, 347 P.2d at 851; see also Mooney v. 
Robinson, 93 Idaho 676,471 P.2d 63 (1970). 
Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397,400,871 P.2d 814, 817 (1994). Plaintiff contends that 
whether a person is a licensee or an invitee is a question of fact to be determined by the jury.15 
15 Plaintiffs Objection to: Third Party Defendants Treasure Valley Area Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics 
Anonymous Literature's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed Aug. 11, 2014, p. 6. 
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The Court could not find any Idaho case directly on point. However, other authorities do state 
The question of whether one suing for damages for personal injuries was a 
licensee or invitee of the defendant is a question for the jury where the status 
depends upon issues of fact created by a contrariety of evidence, but the question 
of whether undisputed facts, essential to determination of the plaintiff's status, 
show him or her to be a licensee or invitee is a legal question for the court. 
62 Am. Jur. 2d Premises Liability§ 85. Further, Idaho law implies that licensee or invitee status 
is a question of fact. The Supreme Court in Holzheimer found that it was appropriate for the jury 
to be instructed on both licensee and invitee status, as there was evidence presented at trial which 
supported both statuses. Holzheimer, 125 Idaho at 400, 871 P.2d at 817. Further, IDJI 3.13 
defines who is an invitee, and IDJI 3.15.1 defines who is a licensee. There would be no purpose 
to having such instructions if only the Court was responsible for determining such status as a 
matter of law, as it could simply instruct the jury on what duty existed. Therefore, premises 
liability duties clearly exist as already set forth in law. Which duty applies is a question of fact to 
be determined by the jury. If there are any facts which could support a finding of either licensee 
or invitee status, summary judgment would not be appropriate. 
Third-Party Defendants seek to have this Court declare that Plaintiff Simona was a 
licensee.16 As the moving party, Third-Party Defendants have the burden of establishing that no 
facts exist which could support a finding that Plaintiff was an invitee at the time of the injury. 
I.R.C.P. 56(c). See also McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765,771,820 P.2d 360,366 (1991). Though 
not directly on point, Idaho Courts have recognized the duty owed by a landlord to a tenant. 
16 
The law recognizes that owner/landlords owe duties to their tenants and their 
tenants' employees to exercise reasonable care (1) "in light of all the 
circumstances," Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 258, 678 P.2d 41, 50 (1984), 
(2) "for protection [from a dangerous condition] even though the dangerous 
condition is known and obvious to the employee," Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 
107 Idaho 593, 595, 691 P.2d 1208, 1210 (1984), and (3) "to provide safe 
conditions for employment upon the premises." Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 
867, 871, 749 P.2d 486, 490 (1988). These duties of the owner/landlord are based 
on the landlord/tenant relationship with the tenant and the tenant's employees. 
Because an owner/landlord exercises control of his building, he also bears 
responsibility for foreseeable injuries to the tenants and their employees resulting 
from his failure to exercise reasonable care. Id. 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed July 10, 2014, p. 3. 
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Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 304, 796 P.2d 506, 513 (1990). The owed 
rule are essentially the same as a duty owed an invitee. As stated above, this rule is 
not directly applicable, because Simono was neither a tenant nor an employee a tenant. 
Neither party has alleged that the duties owed to a tenant translate to the tenant's customers or 
attendees, so the Court will not address whether such a duty applies to Simono. 
Instead, the parties focus on why Plaintiff was present at Turner House on the evening 
she was injured. This goes directly to the issues discussed in Holzheimer. There is little dispute 
about why Plaintiff was at Turner House that evening: Plaintiff was attending a Narcotics 
Anonymous meeting.17 This does not clearly make her a social guest, who is generally deemed a 
licensee. Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535, 545, 347 P.2d 341, 347 (1959). Nor does it clearly 
make her a business guest, who is generally deemed an invitee. Id.18 Simono falls somewhere in 
"between. In order to prevail on summary judgment, Third-Party Defendants would have to prove 
that there is nothing upon which a jury could rely to determine that Plaintiff entered "upon the 
premises of another for a purpose connected with business there conducted, or whose visit may 
reasonably be said to confer or anticipate a business, commercial, monetary or other tangible 
benefit to the [owner/occupant]." IDJI 3.13. 
Third-Party Defendants attempt to argue that Simono, as a matter of law, is a licensee, 
relying on the following language: 
The weight of authority holds that a social guest, though specifically invited, 
stands in the legal relationship to his host of a licensee, to whom the host owes the 
duty of reasonable and ordinary care only. The fact that the guest may be 
rendering a minor, incidental service to the host does not change the relationship. 
Nor is the relationship changed by the fact that the guest and the host may have a 
mutual or common interest in the purpose of the visit, such as the service of a 
church, lodge, or political purpose, or an intangible social benefit to the host. 
Wilson at 545,347 P.2d at 347 (citations omitted, emphasis added). As stated above, Simono was 
not a social guest. The Court does not accept that the fact that Simona was attending a Narcotics 
17 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed Jul. 10, 2014, p. 2; Plaintiff's Objection to: Third Party 
Defendants Treasure Valley Area Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous Literature's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, filed Aug. 11, 2014, p. 4. 
18 "Where a person enters upon the premises of another for a purpose connected with the business there 
conducted, or the visit may reasonably be said to confer or anticipate a business; commercial, monetary or other 
tangible benefit to the occupant, the visitor is held to be an invitee." Wilson, 81 Idaho at 545,347 P.2d at 347. 
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Anonymous meeting, which involved a mutual or common interest between Simono and Third-
Party Defendants, her into a social guest to which this rule may apply. The Court 
does not accept that Simono went to Turner House as a visitor and happened to be discussing 
Narcotics Anonymous issues on the side. Therefore, she is not a social guest as a matter of law, 
either with regard to Defendants or Third-Party Defendants. 
The Court believes that there are a number of facts which a jury could utilize to find that 
Plaintiff was an invitee as to both Defendants and Third-Party Defendants. Third-Party 
Defendants rented space from Turner House for Narcotics Anonymous meetings and Plaintiff 
attended those Narcotics Anonymous meetings. Based on this, a jury could conclude that Ms. 
Simono entered Turner House for a purpose connected with the business there conducted (i.e. 
Turner House rented out the property to be used for meetings, and Plaintiff attending the 
meetings). Narcotics Anonymous also collected money, in the form of donations, from its 
participants to pay rent to Turner House,19 and a jury could :find that Plaintiff's visit to Turner 
House resulted in a business benefit to both Defendants and Third-Party Defendants. It is up to 
the jury to determine whether Plaintiff conferred a business benefit, rendering her an invitee, or 
instead provided "a minor, incidental service to the host," see Wilson, 81 Idaho at 545, 347 P.2d 
at 347, and that she is merely a licensee. There is no error in instructing the jury on both licensee 
and invitee status, particularly where there is evidence to support both statuses. Holzheimer, 125 
Idaho at 400, 871 P.2d at 817. Third-Party Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
cannot therefore be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed Jul. 10, 2014, is 
DENIED. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this 18th day of August, 2014. 
Ly~ 
District Judge 
19 Plaintiffs Objection to: Third Party Defendants Treasure Valley Area Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics 
Anonymous Literature's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed Aug. 11, 2014, p. 4; Koontz Affidavit, Ex. 3, 
pp. 21. 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 1 
You have been summoned as prospective jurors in this lawsuit now before us. The first 
thing we do in a trial is to select 12 jurors and, perhaps, one or two alternate jurors from among 
you ladies and gentlemen. 
I am the judge in charge of the courtroom and this trial. The deputy clerk of court marks 
the trial exhibits and administers oaths to you jurors and the witnesses. The bailiff will assist me 
in maintaining courtroom order and will arrange for your meals after this case has been submitted 
to you for decision. The court reporter will keep a verbatim account of all matters of record 
during the trial. 
To assist both you and the attorneys in this process of selection of a jury, I will introduce 
you to the parties and attorneys and tell you in brief what this lawsuit is about. 
The party who brings a lawsuit is called the "plaintiff." In this suit the plaintiff is Donna 
Simono. The plaintiff is represented by Lee Schlender. The party against whom a lawsuit is 
brought is called a "defendant." In this matter the defendant is Larry Rogers, represented by 
Stanley Tharp; and Third-Party Defendant is Narcotics Anonymous, represented by Rodney 
Saetrum and Ryan Peck. 
This is a civil case involving a claim for damages arising when Ms. Simono fell on the 
stairs at Turner House in downtown Mountain Home. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Rogers 
was negligent in not having adequate lighting in the stairway the evening the Plaintiff fell. The 
Defendant Rogers contends that there was adequate lighting and the Plaintiff fell because of her 
own comparable negligence. 
A trial starts with the selection of a jury. The purpose of the law is to obtain a fair and 
impartial jury. The court and the lawyers will ask each of you questions to discover whether you 
DEFENDANTS/fHIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- PAGE 3 
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any information concerning the case or any opinions or attitudes which either of the lawyers 
believes might cause you to favor or disfavor some part of the evidence or one side or the other. 
questions may probe deeply into your attitudes, beliefs and experiences, but 
intended to embarrass you. 
are not 
If you do not hear or understand a question, you should say so. If you do understand the 
question, you should answer freely. 
The clerk of the court will now swear you in for the jury examination. 
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Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. I have 
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Ladies and Gentlemen: 
Now that you have been sworn, I will briefly tell you something about your duties as 
jurors and give you some instructions. At the end of the trial I will give you more detailed 
instructions, and those instructions will control your deliberation. 
It will be your duty to decide from the evidence what the facts are. You and you alone, 
are the judges of the facts. You will hear the evidence, decide what the facts are, and then apply 
those facts to the law which I will give to you. That is how you will reach your verdict. In doing 
so you must follow the law whether you agree with it or not. 
You must not take anything I may say or do during the trial as indicating what your 
verdict should be. Don't be influenced by my taking notes at times. What I write down may 
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Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in my instructions to 
facts, and in this way to decide the case. In so doing, you must follow my instructions 
regardless of your own opinion of what the law is or should be, or what either side may state the 
law to be. You must consider them as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others. The 
order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative importance. The 
law requires that your decision be made solely upon the evidence before you. Neither sympathy 
nor prejudice should influence you in your deliberations. Faithful performance by you of these 
duties is vital to the administration of justice. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This 
evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered and received, and any 
stipulated or admitted facts. The production of evidence in court is governed by rules of law. At 
times during the trial, an objection may be made to a question asked a witness, or to a witness' 
answer, or to an exhibit. This simply means that I am being asked to decide a particular rule of 
law. Arguments on the admissibility of evidence are designed to aid the Court and are not to be 
considered by you nor affect your deliberations. If I sustain an objection to a question or to an 
exhibit, the witness may not answer the question or the exhibit may not be considered. Do not 
attempt to guess what the answer might have been or what the exhibit might have shown. 
Similarly, if I tell you not to consider a particular statement or exhibit you should put it out of 
your mind, and not refer to it or rely on it in your later deliberations. 
During the trial I may have to talk with the parties about the rules of law which should 
apply in this case. Sometimes we will talk here at the bench. At other times I will excuse you 
from the courtroom so that you can be comfortable while we work out any problems. You are not 
to speculate about any such discussions. They are necessary from time to time and help the trial 
run more smoothly. 
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Some of you have probably heard the terms "circumstantial evidence," "direct evidence" 
"hearsay evidence. Do not be concerned with these terms. You are to consider all the 
However, the law does not require you to believe all the evidence. As the sole judges of 
the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what weight you attach to it. There 
is no magical formula by which one may evaluate testimony. You bring with you to this 
courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. In your everyday affairs you 
determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe, and how much weight you attach 
to what you are told. The same considerations that you use in your everyday dealings in making 
these decisions are the considerations which you should apply in your deliberations. 
In deciding what you believe, do not make your decision simply because more witnesses 
may have testified one way than the other. Your role is to think about the testimony of each 
witness you heard and decide how much you believe of what the witness had to say. 
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give an opinion on that 
matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should consider the 
qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for the opinion. You are not 
bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled. 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5 
The Defendant Rogers asserts that the lighting conditions on the stairs were adequate and 
had never been any complaints to him about inadequate lighting since Narcotics 
Anonymous started holding meetings there in early 2010. 
The Defendant Rogers asserts that he was not negligent, but rather, it was the negligence 
of Ms. Simono that was the proximate cause of her fall and injuries. 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 6 
Certain evidence is about to be presented to you by deposition. A deposition is testimony 
under oath before the trial and preserved in writing. This evidence is entitled to the same 
consideration you would give had the witness testified from the witness stand. 
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although there is a record of the 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 7 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that directly 
,....,.,,.""""' a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact, by proving one 
or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred. 
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the degree 
of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is respected for 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 8 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression 
I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 9 
It was the duty of all persons, including the plaintiff Ms. Defendant Rogers, and 
Defendant Narcotics Anonymous, before and at time of the occurrence, to use 
ordinary care for the safety of themselves and each other. 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER l 0 
When I use the word "negligence" these instructions, I mean the failure to use ordinary 
care the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care" mean the care a 
reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. 
Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person 
would do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person would not do, under 
circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. The law does not say how a reasonably 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 11 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause natural or probable 
sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage complained It need not the only 
cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is 
not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway. 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent conduct of 
two or more persons or entities contributes concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about 
an injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 12 
On the issue of negligence, the plaintiff Ms. ...,u,,i,n_,..., 
propositions: 
the burden to each the 
L A duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendants to conform to a certain 
standard of conduct; 
2. A breach of that duty; 
3. A causal connection between the conduct of Defendant Rogers and Third-Party 
Defendant Narcotics Anonymous and the resulting injuries to plaintiff Ms. 
Simono; and 
4. Actual loss or damage. 
You will be asked the following question on the jury form: "Was there negligence on the 
part of the Defendant Rogers and Third-Party Defendant Narcotics Anonymous, which was the 
proximate cause of plaintiffs damages?" 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case that each of the 
propositions contained in this instruction has been proved, you should answer the jury question 
''yes." If you find that any of these propositions has not been proved, you should answer the 
question "no." 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 13 
In this case, the Defendant Rogers and Third-Party Defendant Narcotics Anonymous have 
each of the following propositions: 
1. The plaintiff was negligent. 
2. The negligence of Ms. Simono was a proximate cause of her own injuries. 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: "Was the plaintiff 
Donna Simono negligent, and if so was the plaintiff's negligence a proximate cause of her 
injuries?" 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has 
been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find that any of these 
propositions has not been proved, then the defendants have not met their burden of proof required 
and you should answer this question ''No." 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 14 
You must decide from the evidence if Rogers knew, or by the exercise reasonable care 
~u~--have kno\vn, of the existence inadequate lighting on the stairs. 
Rogers must have had either actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition in 
order to establish a breach of the duty of care. 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 15 
A person fails to exercise ordinary care for her own safety when she does something or 
to do something under circumstances which a reasonable person would foresee that by 
her action or failure to act, she will subject a person or property to an unreasonable risk of injury 
or damage. Thus, when a reasonable person knows or should know that a course of conduct 
poses substantial, inherent risks, yet the person persists in the conduct voluntarily and suffers 
injury as a result, the person will not be permitted to recover from someone who is less negligent. 
If you find that Ms. Simono engaged in conduct that contributed to her injury, you must 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 16 
An invitee is a person who enters upon the premises of another for a purpose connected 
business there or whose visit may reasonably be said to confer or anticipate a 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 17 
An occupant owes a duty of ordinary care under all circumstances towards invitees who 
come upon the premises. duty extends to all portions premises to which an invitee 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 18 
A licensee is a visitor that goes upon the premises of another with consent of the 
landlord the pursuit a visitor's purpose. A duty owed to a licensee is narrow. 
landowner is only required to share with the licensee knowledge of dangerous conditions or 
activities on the land. 
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licensee is a person who goes upon the premises of another in pursuit of the visitor's 
the consent of the occupant or owner. The consent the occupant or owner may 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 20 
Tenants owe a duty ordinary care under all circumstances towards invitees who come 
the premises. 
Harrison v. Tay!or, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989). 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 21 
A tenant is to keep its premises in a reasonably safe condition for its invitees even though 
the landlord has covenanted to maintain the premises. 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 22 
The tenant cannot, by the terms of the lease, be discharged from the duty to its guests or 
customers of caring for their safety. 
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• 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 23 
The tenant having control of the premises is deemed, so far as third parties are concerned, 
to the owner, and in case of injury to third parties occasioned by the condition or use of the 
premises, the general rule is that the tenant may be liable for failure to keep the premises in 
repair. 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 24 
The tenant, but not the owner is liable for irtjuries to a third party caused by the condition 
or use of the premises so far, at least, as they were under his control. A tenant having control 
over the demised premises is deemed, so far as third parties or the public are concerned, to be the 
owner, and in cases of injuries to third parties, occasioned by the condition or use of the 
premises, it is a general rule, prima facie, breach of duty and therefore the liability is that of the 
tenant and not that of the owner. 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 25 
Under an ordinary negligence standard of care, the owner or occupier the premises is 
held strictly liable for injuries to persons who enter upon the property. The duty not be 
negligent is only a duty to take reasonable precautions against risk of undue harm. 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 26 









DEFENDANTS/I'HIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- PAGE 30 
83041-26 / 00507073.000 
• 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 27 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 28 
The owner owes a duty to warn a licensee only of dangerous existing hazards on the land 
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• 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 29 
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• 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 30 
A contract written or oral, or may contain both written terms and oral terms. So 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 31 
contract is an agreement between two or more parties to or not something that is 
supported by consideration. 
There are four elements to complete a contract. Every contract must have these four 
elements. The four elements are: 
1. Competent parties; 
2. A lawful purpose; 
3. Valid consideration; and 
4. Mutual agreement by all parties to all essential terms. 
It is not disputed that the above elements are present in the contract alleged in this case. 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 32 
Rogers and Barker have the burden of proving each of the following propositions: 
1. contract existed between Rogers and Barker and Narcotics Anonymous; 
2. Narcotics Anonymous breached the contract; 
3. Rogers and Barker have been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount of the damages. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions 
required of Rogers and Barker has been proved, then you mu;,t consider the issue of the 
affirmative defenses raised by Narcotics Anonymous. If you find from your consideration of all 
the evidence that any of the propositions in this instruction has not been proved, your verdict 
should be for Narcotics Anonymous on the breach of contract claim. 
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• 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 33 
"material breach of contract," as that term is used in these instructions, means a breach 
defeats a fundamental purpose of the contract. 








DEFENDANTSJTHIRD-P ARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- PAGE 37 
83041-26 / 00507073.000 
509 
• 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 34 
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• 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 35 
When I use "value" or the phrase "fair market value" in these instructions as to 
services rendered, I mean the amount of money that a willing employer would pay and a willing 
employee would accept for the services in question, under circumstances as existed immediately 
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• 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 36 
person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize damage and 
further damage. loss that results from a failure to exercise such care cannot 
recovered. 
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• 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 37 
Damages must be proven with reasonable certainty. The existence and extent damages 
Anderson v. Nafziger v. GT Newcomb, Inc., 
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• 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 38 
jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from either or both defendants, the 
determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate plaintiff 
for any damages proved to be proximately caused by the negligence of such defendant(s). 
The elements of damage the jury may consider are: 
A. Non-economic damages 
1. The nature of the injuries; 
2. The physical and mental pain and sufferL."lg, past and future; 
3. The impairment of abilities to perform usual activities; 
B. Economic damages 
1. The reasonable value of necessary medical care received and expenses 
incurred as a result of the injury. 
Whether the plaintiff has proved any of these elements is for the jury to decide. 







DEFENDANTS/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS-PAGE 42 
83041-26 / 00507073.000 
514 
• 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 39 
deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide any 
ues1non by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages are to 
be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not agree in advance to average 
the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method of determining the amount of the 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 40 
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding 
matters that may consider weighing the evidence to determine the facts. a few minutes 
counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room for 
your deliberations. 
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the 
attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the outset of 
deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the 
case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense 
of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it 
is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for 
me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the objective of 
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of 
you must decide this case for yourself, but you should do so only after a discussion and 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 41 
The original instructions and the exhibits will be with you in the jury room. They are part 
official court record. For this reason, please do not alter them or mark them any way. 
The instructions are numbered for convenience in referring to specific instructions. There 
may or may not be a gap in the number of the instructions. If there is, you should not concern 
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• 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 42 
room, select one of you as a foreman, who will preside over your 
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Follow the 
directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you by the instructions 
on the verdict form. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon as 
nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the verdict, you 
should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the same nine agree on 
each question. If your verdict is anonymous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more, 
but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict, you will notify the baliff, who will 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 43 
it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with may send 
a signed by one or more you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me 
by any means other than such a note. 
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on any of 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 44 
this case you will be given a special verdict form to use returning verdict. This 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 45 
this case you will return a special verdict, consisting of a series of questions which 
".IU'"'' .......... answer. In answering each question you must be persuaded, considering all the evidence 
in the case, that your choice of answers is more probably true than not true. 
We, the Jury, answer the questions submitted to us in the Special Verdict as follows: 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
Question No. 1: Was there negligence on the part of Defendant Larry Rogers which was a 
proximate cause of the Plaintiffs damages? 
Answer to Question No.1: Yes L_] No L_] 
Proceed to Question No. 2. 
Question No. 2: Was there negligence on the part of Third-Party Defendant Treasure Valley Area 
of Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous Literature which was a proximate cause of the 
Plaintiffs damages? 
Answer to Question No. 2: Yes L_] No L_] 
If your answers to both Questions No. 1 and 2 are "No," do not answer any further questions. 
Simply sign the verdict and advise the Bailiff. If your answer to either or both of Questions No. 1 
and 2 is "Yes," proceed to Question No. 3. 
Question No. 3: Was there negligence on the part of the Plaintiff, Donna Simono, which was the 
proximate cause of the Plaintiffs damages? 
Answer to Question No. 3: Yes L_] No [__J 
Proceed to Question No. 4. 
Question No. 4: You are now to apportion the fault of the parties in terms of a percentage. Insert 
the percentage of negligence of each party, if any, which was a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's 
damages. Your percentages must total I 00%. 
a) Plaintiff Donna Simono % 
b) Defendant Larry Rogers % 
c) Third-Party Defendant Narcotics Anonymous 
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Proceed to Question No. 5. 





Sign the verdict and advise the Bailiff. 
IDll 1.43.l 






$ ____ _ 
$ ____ _ 
Total Damages: $ ____ _ 
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IN"STRUCTION NUMBER 46 
now completed your duties as jurors in this case and are discharged with the 
Court. You may now discuss this case with the attorneys or with anyone 
else. For your guidance, I instruct you that whether you talk to the attorneys, or to anyone else, is 
entirely your own decision. It is proper for you to discuss this case, if you want to, but you are 
not required to do so, and you may choose not to discuss the case with anyone at all. If you 
choose to talk to someone about this case, you may tell them as much or as little as you like 
about your deliberations or the facts that influenced your decisions. If anyone persists in 
discussing the case over your objection, or becomes critical of your service, either before or after 
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DA TED this 30th day of October, 2014. 
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Attorneys for Turner House, 
Larry J. Rogers and Cheryl Barker 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregojng document 
was served upon the following attorney(s) this 30th day of October, 2014, as indicated below and 1 
addressed as follows: 
Sheli Fulcher Koontz 
LAW-IDAHO PLLC 
802 W. Bannock, Suite 101 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorneyafor Plaintl/f 
E. Leo Schlender 
SCHLENDER LAW OFFICES 
2700 Holly Lynn Drive 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Attornepafor Plaintiff 
Rodney R. Saetrum / Ryan B. Peck 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
3046 S. Bown Way 
Post Office Box 7425 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Attorneys for Third Patty Dej'e11da'flt8 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax (208) 888-9970 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[-I'] Email Transmission 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax (208) 587-3535 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ¥"'] Email Transmission 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax (208) 336-0448 
[ ] . Hand Delivery 
[ ./] Email Transmission 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 47 
The owner owes a duty to wam a licensee only of dangerous existing hazards on land 
were known to the owner and unknown to and not reasonably discoverable by the licensee. 
Chapman v. Chapman, 141 ldaho 156 (2009). 
Given ----R.efused.~~~ 
Modified ---Covered ----Other ---
Judge 
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Case No. CV~2013-209 
FINAL PRETRIAL ORDER 
Ervin Schlender and Sheli Fulcher Koontz for Plaintiff 
Stanley J. Tharp for Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs 
Ryan B. Peck for Third-Party Defendants 




This trial has been reset multiple times. In July, trial had to be reset due to a criminal 
case tried at that time. This matter is currently set for a five-day jury trial. 
This matter came before the Court again for a final pretrial conference on November 3, 
2014. This is case is currently still set with three other cases to begin December 2, 2014. The 
Court has one criminal trial set to begin December 2, 2014 which could take priority on the 
court's calendar. The other three matters are civil cases and this case has first priority among the 
civil cases because of its age and prior trial delay. 
The Amended Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing Further Proceedings 
filed August 22, 2014 is further amended as follows: · 
Assuming the criminal case resolves, the court anticipates Judge Norton will 
try this case beginning on Tuesday, December 2, 2014 from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. 
with the jury beginning at 8 a.m. that morning and the parties present at . 
8:30 a.m.; Wednesday, December 3, 2014 from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.; the trial will 
skip Thursday, December 4, 2014 because of matters set in A~a County; then 
resume Friday, December 5, 2014 from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.; the trial will skip 
Monday, December 8, 2014; then resume Tuesday, December 9, 2014 from 9 
a.m. to 5 p.m.; and conclude Wednesday, December 10, 2014 from 9 a.m. to 5 
p.m. 
If the court needs to further amend the trial schedule because of the double-set 
criminal trial, the co0:rt will send out an amended pretrial order. 
At the pretrial conference, the court and parties discussed whether there were stipulations 
to the admissibility of evidence, stipulations of facts, or an exchange of exhibits. The parties are 
to meet and confer before the trial related to these stipulations and to review the other party.' s 
Final Pretrial Order 2 
'/ 
exhibits so these matters can be presented to the court on the morning the trial begins. The 
Plaintiff, the Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs, and Third-Party Defendants had filed proposed 
instructions, exhibit lists, and witness lists at the previous pretrial conference. Some 
materials were supplemented at this pretrial conference. The Plaintiff should mark exhibits with 
numbers; the Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs should mark their exhibits with letters A through 
YY; the Third-Party Defendants should mark theirs with Roman numerals. The parties should 
contact Judge Norton's Elmore County Clerk, Heather Furst, if there are any additional questions 
about marking exhibits. 
Third-Party Defendant NA's motions in limine and Defendants' Request for Ruling on 
Objections at Videotaped Trial Deposition are currently pending before the court and will be 
heard at 3 p.m. on November 17, 2014. Previously filed motions in limine were decided March 
17, 2014. Counsel for the Third-Party Defendants has requested to appear telephonically and 
may appear telephonically by setting up the hearing through Court Call (information on Elmore 
County District Court website or by calling the Elmore County District Court Clerk if needed to 
set that up). 
At the pretrial conference, the Plaintiff dismissed Cheryl Barker as a Defendant. 
The Plaintiff had twenty-two witnesses on their witness list but anticipates calling ten or 
eleven witnesses; the Defendants anticipate calling up to seven witnesses disparate from those 
identified by the Plaintiff and did not delineate which are in the defense case-in-chief, compared 
to which are for the Third-Party Plaintiffs case-in-chief; the Third-Party Defendant anticipates 
calling one witness disparate from the other parties' witnesses. The parties were not aware of 
any specific scheduling conflict with witnesses. Any specific scheduling conflicts of witnesses 
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should be noticed to the court, with that notice also provided to the other parties, in advance of 
Proposed instructions have been filed and the court will distribute a collated draft of 
jury instructions to the handling counsel for each party at the e-mail address entered in the Idaho 
State Bar Directory prior to the commencement of the trial. If the parties desire they be sent to a 
different e-mail address or prefer a hard copy, they should contact the District Court Clerk. 
A panel of 75 jurors will be assembled by the jury commissioner. Since this is a five-
day trial but without consecutive days, the jury will include two alternate jurors. The court will 
use a struck jury with two alternate jurors so each the Plaintiff will receive 7 peremptory 
challenges, the Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs will receive 7 peremptory challenges, and the 
Third-Party Defendants will receive 7 peremptory challenges, for an initial panel of 35 jurors. 
The jury list in random order is only available in paper copy and will be available to the parties 
at the Elmore County Courthouse the week of Thanksgiving. Contact the District Court Clerk 
about availability or if you want to observe the random draw. Each party will have a maximum 
of 45 minutes each for the party's voir dire. 
The Court discussed the presentation of evidence. Presentation of a video deposition is 
anticipated. If the parties intend to use computer or other electronic devices in the courtroom 
during the trial, they must provide the device for the courtroom and also note that public wi-fi or 
internet access is not available in the Elmore County Courthouse. If a powerpoint or other 
digital presentation is presented to the court, the version presented to the court must be saved 
on a CD and given to the Clerk for preservation in the court file. 
If the parties reach a settlement in this case prior to trial, such settlement must be in 
writing and conform to the requirements of Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54, 60 and 75. A trial 
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not be vacated until all settlement documents are filed with the court and the court 
approves such settlement. Any settlement documents must be filed in Elmore County. 
the court is Ada the week before this trial and will be in hearings in Elmore 
County all day on Monday just before this trial is set to begin, there is only limited availability to 
review settlements. Please plan accordingly. 
While Judge Norton maintains chambers in both Elmore County and Ada County, 
Elmore County matters must be filed in the Elmore County Clerk's Office. The clerk in Ada 
County is not responsible for taldng, forwarding, or answering questions on behalf of Elmore 
County. All matters must be filed with the District Court Clerk in Elmore County with, chambers 
copies delivered electronically to both lnorton@adaweb.net and hfurst@elmorecounty.org. 
AND IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this t)~y of November, 2014. 
Lynn~trictJud 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
correct copy of the foregoing aocmmtent was sent to the 
E. Lee Schlender 
2700 Holly Lynn Drive 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Sheli Fulcher Koontz 
802 W. Bannock, Suite 101 
Boise, ID 83702 
Stanley J. Tharp 
P.O. Box 1368 
Boise, ID 83701 
Ryan Peck 
P.O. Box 7425 
Boise, ID 83707 
Dated this 7th day of November, 2014. 
532 
BARBARA STEELE 
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four ~otions came bef6.re the court for h~arjng on NovemberJ 7, 2014'. First, there Wa$ . 
objectio~ to sp.6rteningJime to h_ear the Plaintiffs kiended !vtotio~s in L~~, ait1iough it 
was filed November 201~ .. Aµ opposition.'was filed Noyember.10, 2011 andjoin~d. 'Tllete 
an bbje~iori fo the.: C«Jiut ~6nsidering the uiit~elyJile4 reply. • J']1e reply W11S ~9 untime1; it 
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had., !!Ot ~crually made it to tlie.,:courFfile/at th¢ 'time of. the he~iµg so, ,the· reply wasr.not 
• 'o' , ,. '.·· , ".',, . '._ •· .. ,·. i '• ; • , . ,.' ,.· ·, \ ,· ,'.,,' I 
considered.'/ 'ijbwe.ver~ the \court''.. did cbijside.r the •. Affidavit; of B; . ~e Schlender. R~garqing 
Deko~itjonPa~~$ ofR,:onaJd l{risterisen ¥,])
1
'.':tµet1aftJf th~ .Iie.ating be~J~seJt hid 6t1e· additional 
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page:, of,clepositiori testiinony excluded i:rl P~fe.q:clants' response.. . 
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Trial courts in~y exercis'e "broad discretion when ruling ona motion ~Hmine." Cramer· 
,-:· ' 1 ,.-_, ', ·:"/,::,\,::: .. ; ·,,::(.~(,.", :.>........ . . .1 .. < ">\ ·:,.)/,> -· .... \,"··',}. ,',':· ."· ' .' l - ,~·. ·/ :·.·:;. :~< ·, 
v. Slater, 146 IdajipJ368;. 878, 204J\3d ~08~ 518 (2009). A inotion inJinrine eriablesa. judge to 
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rule on eyidence without first exposing the evidence to the jury, thus avoiding jtrror bias that may 
: . , , . ' .. ,·' .· ··' :·. :;: ·::·:,· ·1,· , . , . .,' ·· .. · .,;:, : ·- , . . , . , , , . '. \ , . , , :' , , ·, .. ., ' n:, , ;. ',.' ', .~.'l . 
be gen~rated by 09jections to the evidence during trial and all()WS counsel, ori botn· sides, to 
make strategic deci~ionsJ>efoi'e the ,trial concerning the context and order of th~ evidence to be 
presented. Davidspn v. Beco Corp., 112 Idaho 560, 563, 733 p.2d 781, 784 ·(1986); Stat~ v. 
Young,, 136 Idaho 113, 120, 29 P.3d 949,956 (2001). Idaho Rule ofEvidence 103(c) directs that 
proceedings shall be conducted so as ,to prevent inadmissiMe evidence from being suggested to 
the jury, to the extent practicable. The trial court may re~o~sider a motion in limine at any time, 
including when the' actual presentation of facts is made. Warren v. Sharp, 139 Idaho 599, 605, 83 
P .3d 773, 779 (2003). 
,\. 
A. Third-Party Defendant's Motions in Limine riled 10/29/14 
Most of these motions in limine are related to the court's orders in limine decided March 
17, 2014. 
\ 
The court denies part A which raises objections to the court's denial of the previous 
' 
motion to dismiss. Such is not a request to limit the presentation at evidence at trial, but rather a 
\. 
motion to reconsider this court's previous ruling. As such, it is not a proper motion in limine and 
is DENIED. 
Part B.1., evidence of settlement negotiations inadmissible under IRE 408 was previously 
prohibited by the court's earlier order and any subsequent offers of settlement are incorporated 
into that ruling. GRANTED. 
Part B.2., evidence of insurance prohibited under IRE 411 was previously prohibited by 
the court's earlier order and is still GRANTED. 
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Part B.3, request to exclude witnesses and documents which were not disclosed is 
DENIED. The court has no idea what witnesses and documents were previously disclosed and 
not speculate ruling on this motion. The court will not know the parties believe 
something was not P,reviously disclosed until there is actually a specific objection at trial. 
Therefore, this part of the motion is DENIED. 
B. Defendants' Request Ruling on Objections to Video Deposition filed 8/8/14 
The court GRANTS the motion as to Page 32, lines 13-21 of the deposition since this 
question calls for speculation or an opinion of the declarant' s honesty or accuracy without a basis 
for such opinion. The court DENIES the motion excluding presentation of Page 58, lines 13-22, 
from the deposition to the jury. The objection at the deposition was form of the question and 
speculation. The court finds this response permissible under IRE 803. 
C. Plaintiff's Amended Motions in Limine flled 11/7/14 
This motion is in two parts: objecting to any reference to the Plaintiff smoking or being a 
smoker and objecting to the Department of Labor unemployment compensation records. 
1. Smoking 
The Plaintiff objects to any information being presented before the jury to the Plaintiff 
smoking under Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403, or 404. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts is not admissible to prove the Plaintiffs character of "being a smoker'' or "smoking" or her 
conformity therewith. However, such evidence may be admissible for a purpose other than that 
prohibited by I.R.E. 404(b). The admissibility of evidence is generally at this court's discretion. 
However, under Rule 404(b) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence the court must follow a two-tiered 
analysis. First, the court must determine (1) if there is sufficient evidence to establish the prior 
bad acts as fact and (2) whether the prior bad acts are relevant to a material disputed issue, other 
than propensity. First, there is no dispute at the hearing that the Plaintiff smoked during the time 
she was in treatment for the injuries alleged in the complaint. Therefore, at this point, the court 
finds based on Dr. Kristensen's there is sufficient evidence that the Plaintiff smoked while being 
treated for the alleged injuries. 
Therefore, it moves to the second determination of relevancy. Whether evidence is 
relevant is a matter of law. Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence." The Defendants raise as their third affirmative defense 
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the failure to mitigate and the Third Party Defendants raise as their fourth affirmative defense the 
failure to mitigate damages. IDJI 9.14-Mitigation of damages, requested by Defendant in the 
proposed instructions, provides "A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to 
minimize the damage and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to 
exercise such care cannot be recovered." In looking at portions of Dr. Kristensen's testimony 
presented as a whole and all of his responses related to the Plaintiff's smoking, the court does 
find the testimony that "the literature and experience is pretty clear that smoking does have an 
adverse impact on healing" to 1;,e relevant to mitigation of damages. While Dr. Kristensen's 
testimony, taken as a whole including page 41, is that the Plaintiff's time of healing was within 
normal limits, his testimony is still relevant to the "quality" of her healing, even if not relevant to 
the amount of time of the healing. Paragraph 22 of the Complaint seeks special damages for 
injuries including pain and suffering, mental anguish and grief, and loss of the pleasures of life, 
among other things. Therefore, the evidence that she smoked a half pack a day of cigarettes 
during the time of her medical treatment and recovery is relevant to damages on these issues and 
the duty to mitigate affirmative defense. Therefore, the court will not exclude this evidence 
under I.R.E. 401 as irrelevant. 
However, even if the evidence is relevant, the decision to exclude it rests with the 
discretion of the court. Next under this analysis, the court must determine whether the probative 
value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Therefore, this Court must 
(1) correctly perceive the issue as discretionary; (2) act within the outer bounds of its discretion 
and within the applicable legal standards; and (3) reach its decision through an exercise of 
reason. The Plaintiff offered as basis for unfair prejudice that there may be jurors who are of a 
religious faith that oppose smoking. This is not a sufficient basis to preclude evidence or even 
show the probative value of any evidence is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice if 
people of faith sit as jurors. The standard for removal of a juror for cause is if there is an actual 
bias under Idaho Code§ 19-2019 or implied bias under Idaho Code§ 19-2020. The court will 
not presume that every member of the Latter Day Saints ( or any other faith group) has an actual 
or implied bias against any party that smokes and, is therefore, unable to sit as a juror in any 
personal injury case. The parties may inquire into attitudes and bias toward smoking in the 
parties' voir dire, but the court will not presume bias. If a juror states an actual or implied bias 
meeting the statutory standard for excusal as a juror, it should be raised as a challenge in voir 
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As this motion relates to presentation of evidence after the jury is selected, th~ Plaintiff has 
shown that the probative value of the statements that smoking may delay healing are 
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice that the jury may know that the Plaintiff smokes. 
u=,., ............. i:a:. is a legal activity-even if unhealthy. There may be prejudice here given the 
affirmative defense of mitigation, but the prejudice to the Plaintiff is not unfair in this case. 
Given the facts, claims ,and defenses in this case, the fact that the Plaintiff smoked during the 
recovery of this injury is relevant and the probative value of that evidence is no substantially 
outweighed by unfair prejudice-· the standard under Rule 403. 
Having determined the evidence is relevant under 401, and not substantially outweighed 
by unfair prejudice under 403, the court returns to the analysis under I.R.E. 404(b) of whether it 
is admissible for a purpose other than to provide conduct to show that Ms. Simono acted in 
conformity with "being a smoker" or had the character of "a smoker'' (whatever that might be) 
under Rule 404. Smoking tobacco is not a crime. Given the legality of smoking tobacco, the 
court isn't even convinced it is a "wrong." So the court will simply analyze it as an "act" under 
the rule. That act may be admissible for other purposes and Rule 404(b) does not limit those 
purposes to those most frequently 'recited in criminal cases of "proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." I.R.E. 404(b). 
The court has already determined that ·the Plaintiff's smoking is admissible for the purpose of 
explaining a diminished "quality" of healing relevant to damages for pain and suffering, mental 
anguish and grief, and loss of the pleasures of life, as well as relevant to the affirmative defense 
of mitigation. This is a permissible purpose pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) that takes it outside of 
showing the Plaintiff is of bad character because she engages in the act of smoking tobacco. 
Therefore, after applying the standards in I.R.E. 401, 402, 403 and 404, the motion to 
limit references to the Plaintiff's smoking as presented in Dr. Kristen's deposition excerpts 
presented with the motion in limine and responses are DENIED. 
2. Department of Labor records 
The Plaintiff stated at the hearing that it is withdrawing any claims to lost wages, past 
present or future. The Plaintiff asserts that any Department of Labor records showing the 
Plaintiff worked while claiming unemployment are therefore irrelevant under IRE 401. The 
Plaintiff has not withdrawn claims for damages including pain and suffering, mental anguish and 
grief, and loss of the pleasures of life. On page 13 of the Plaintiff's deposition, the question was 
ORDERS ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE 5 
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' re~pons~:.wa1, :'Ai My p~in· and·'.swelling in)ny. aiikle}:.\i\'.dditioria11{ at page 46 th~ qriesti~1rwas > 
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untn1tryth~t.+/rliai'c1ep~;1i1cinwils tak~11.August 14, 2013:', - . 
' •·' ·.· ', •'/,· :':,'. ,·,.'·:···.,y .. ,.,.;: .... .'' ··: ·.·?.l ',, ' .·· ' ... ' ' ' ' 
.:To the extenLth~t the Department .of Labor records contain statements.. by,the Plaintiff 
,, \' ·:' . 1·· ... , . ;< '.< )·.J, ·.:/· .. ,:,:_,.,;·' ,- _;: ,_:_. , ,' " ... !/~·.7\• ·t , ', , ,·, :· ~- '· \:.:' ·-<. ,. . ', i, · ; . ' .• 
from Match 30,.2014. through Aligust 26, ·2013. t,hat she was able to work and/or looking for 
work, ,siich rec~rds are, admissions .of a party oppdne~t and relevant to damages for pain. and 
suffering; ment~ anguish and grief, and loss of the pleasures of life she is' still claiming. 
' . . ' - ' 
(Swartl~y :Af:fd. Ex.. C, pp. 1()0-123). To the extent that it is the Defendant that would seek 
admission of:this evidence, the court finds .these statements by the Plaintiff are admissions. of a 
party opponent~ admissible pursuant'to IRE 80l(d)(2). Additionally, if the Plaintiff testifies or 
' ' 
admits her deposition during the Plaintiff's case in chief, such statements may also be admissible 
pursuant to I.R.E: 801(d)(l) as prior inconsistent statements by a witness and/or I.R.E. 613. 
• I 
To the extent the Defendants are requesting evidence of other portions of the records be. 
permitted as impeachment to impeach the. credibility of the Plaintiff, the court reserves such 
ruling until after the Plaintiff's testifimony or case-in-chief to determine whether these r,ecords 
are admissible and for which purpose(s). (Swartley Affd. Ex. C, pp. 124-185). 
This motion is GRANTED IN PART AND RESERVED IN PART. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this 19th day of November, 2014. 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 48 
There is no dispute in this case that Bob Foss was the agent the principal. Treasure 
of Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous Literature, at the time of the 
transaction described by the evi(lence. Therefore, Treasure Valley Area of Narcotics Anonymous 
and Narcotics Anonymous Literature. the principal. is responsible for any act of, Bob Foss, the 
agent. within the scope of the agent's authority. 
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JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
The Plaintiff has dismissed all cla~rt Defendant Cheryl Barker. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED thi~_d~ ayy o JfN~--
Lyn orton 
District Judge 
ORDER DISMISSING CHERYL BARKER AS DEFENDANT 
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Case No. CV-2013-209 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 








~ PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS 
can well surmise, this case is important to both sides, and each party to the suit is entitled 
full and fair consideration, 
are certain things you must not do during this trial: 
1. You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or their 
employees, or any of the witnesses. 
2 You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss the case 
with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to influence your decision in the case, 
you must report it to me promptly. 
3. You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury room to 
deliberate at the close of the entire case. 
4. You must not make up your mind until you have heard all of the testimony and have 
received my instructions as to the law that applies to the case. 
5. You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater 
understanding of the case. 
6. You must not go to the place where any alleged event occurred. 
Members of the Jury, we are about to begin the trial of a lawsuit. Some of you may be unfamiliar 
with the procedures in which you are about to participate; I am going, therefore, to outline briefly 
for you how this trial will proceed. Now that the jury is selected and sworn, I am going to read to 
you some of your instructions. Then the attorneys will make opening statements; the defendant's 
attorney may, if he wishes, save his opening statement until later. The opening statement is 
intended to inform you about the party's case, and what the party claims and what evidence the 
party intends to produce for you. The opening statement is not evidence, however. 
Then each side offers evidence. The plaintiff proceeds first and offers evidence on the plaintiff's 
claim. The defendant then offers evidence on the defendant's claim and defense. Thereafter, 
rebuttal evidence may be offered. After the evidence is in, I will read to you the rest of your 
instructions. In those instructions I will tell you what the law is and will tell you what you will 
have to decide. 
Then the trial concludes with the arguments of the lawyers for both sides. Finally you will be 
taken to a place where you can deliberate on your verdict in privacy. I will now give you some of 
your instructions to aid you during the course of this trial. 
DUTY OF COURT: If during the trial I may say or do anything which suggests to you that I am 
inclined to favor the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced 
by any such suggestion. I will not express nor intend to express, nor will I intend to intimate, any 
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established; or what inferences should be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of mine 
seems to indicate an opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard 
NOTE TAKING: If you wish, you may take notes to helpyou remember what witnesses said. 
do. take notes, please keep them to yourself until you and your fellow jurors go. to the jury 
room to decide the case at the end of the trial. You should not let note-taking distract you so that 
you do nothear other answers by witnesses. When you leave at night, please leave your notes in 
the. jury room. 
If you do take notes, you should rely on your own memory of what was said· and not be overly 
influenced by the notes of other jurors. In addition, you cannot assign one person the duty of 
taking notes for all of you. If you take notes.during the trial, be careful that your attention is not 
thereby diverted from the witness or bis testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and 
not show them to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the trial. 
CONDUCT OF JURORS: It is important that as jurors and officers of this court you obey the 
following instructions. at any time you leave the jury box, whether it be for recesses of the court 
during the day or when you leave the courtroom to go home at night. 
Do not discuss this case during the trial with anyone, including any of the attorneys, 
parties, witnesses, your friends, or members of your family. "No discussion" also means no 
emailing, text messaging, tweeting, blogging, posting to electronic bulletin boards, and any other 
form of communication, electronic or otherwise. 
Do not discuss this case with other jurors until you begin your deliberations at the end of 
the trial. Do not attempt to decide the case until you begin your deliberations. 
I will give you some form of this instruction every time we take a break. I do that not to 
insult you or because I don't think you are paying attention, but because experience has shown 
this is one of the hardest instructions for jurors to follow. I know of no other situation in our 
culture where we ask strangers to sit together watching and listening to something, then go into a 
little room together and not talk about the one thing they have in common: what they just 
watched together. 
There are at least two reasons for this rule. The frrst is to help you keep an open mind. 
When you talk about things, you start to make decisions about them and it is extremely 
important that you not make any decisions about this case until you have heard all the evidence 
and all the rules for making your decisions, and you won't have that until the very end of the trial. 
The second reason for the rule is that we want all of you working together on this decision when 
you deliberate. If you have conversations in groups of two or three during the trial, you won't 
remember to repeat all of your thoughts and observations for the rest of your fellow jurors· when 
you deliberate at the end of the trial. 





case, tell that person that you cannot discuss the case because ycnf are a juror. · If that person 
persists, simply walk away ancl report the incident to the bailiff. 
Do .not make any independent personal investigations into any facts or locations 
connected with this case. Do not look up any information from any source, including the 
Internet Do not communicate any private orspedal knowledge about any of the facts of this. 
case to yourfellowjurors: Do notread or listen to any news reports about this case or about 
anyone involved in this case, .whether those reports are in newspapers or the Internet, or on radio 
or television. 
In our daily lives we may be used to looking for information on-line and.to "Google'' 
something as a matter of routine. Also, in a trial it can be very tempting for jurors to do their 
own research to make sure they are making the correct decision. You must resist that temptation 
for our system of justice to work as it should. I specifically instruct that you must decide the case 
only on the evidence received here in court. If you communicate with anyone about the case or 
do outside research duringthe trial it could cause us to have to start the trial over with new jurors 
and you could be held in contempt of court. · 
While you are actually deliberating in the jury room, the bailiff will confiscate all cell 
phones and other means of electronic communications. Should you need to communicate with 






~ RECESS INSTRUCTION 
During the course of this trial, including the jury selection process, you are instructed that you 
are not to discuss this case among yourselves or with anyone else, nor to form an opinion as to 
the merits of the case until after the case has been submitted to you for your determination. 
When I say "discuss this case ... with anyone else," I include in that that you are not to use e-mail, 
text messaging, tweeting, blogging, electronic bulletin boards, or any other fofm of 
communication, electronic or otherwise, to communicate with others, even including other 
jurors, to communicate about this case. You are also not to conduct any personal investigation or 
look up any information from any source, including the Internet, during the jury selection, the 
trial, or during deliberations. Do not form an opinion as to the merits of the case until after the 
case has been submitted to you for your determination. 
¢ SHORT FORM RECESS INSTRUCTION 
Members of the jury, I remind you that you are not to discuss this case among yourselves 
or with anyone else, nor to form any opinion as to the merits of the case, until after I finally 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _l_ 
The testimony of Michael Perez and Plaintiff's Exhibits 18, 19 .. and 20 were admitted only 
j 
consideration in the 'claims of the Plaintiff against the Defendants Turner House and Larry 
Rogers .. Jtis not to be considered for claims in.the Third Party Complaint by Turner House, Larry 
Rogers, and Cheryl Barker against the Third Party Defendant Treasµry Valley Area of Narcotics 
Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous Literature. Whenever evidence is admitted for a limited 
purpose, you must not consicler such evidence for any purpose other than the limited purpose for 





INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
Certain evidence was presented to you by deposition. A deposition is testimony taken 
before the trial preserved in writing, and sometimes upon video tape. evidence is 
entme:ct to the same consideration you would give had the witness testified from the witness stand. 
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although there is a record of the 






INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
The testimony James Krieger was admitted only for consideration in the claims of the 
u•=··,._._,_ against the Defendants Turner House and Larry Rogers. It is not to be· considered for 
claims in the Third Party Complaint by Turner House, Larry Rogers, and Cheryl Barker against the 
Third Party Defendant Treasure Valley Area of Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous 
Literature. Whenever evidence is admitted for a limited purpose, you must not consider such 
evidence for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which it is admitted. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
The testimony of Dr. Karl Olson was admitted only for consideration in the claims of the 
Plaintiff against the Defendants Turner House and Larry Rogers. It is not to be considered for 
claims in the Third Party Complaint by Turner House, Larry Rogers, and Cheryl Barker against the 
Third Party Defendant Treasure Valley Area of Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous 
Literature. Whenever evidence is admitted for a limited purpose, you must not consider such 
evidence for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which it is admitted. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
The testimony of Scott Mederios was admitted only for consideration in the claims of the 
Plaintiff against the Defendants Turner House and Larry Rogers. It is not to be considered for 
claims in the Third Party Complaint by Turner House, Larry Rogers, and Cheryl Barker against the 
Third Party Defendant Treasure Valley Area of Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous 
Literature. Whenever evidence is admitted for a limited purpose, you must not consider such 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
You have heard the testimony of Donna Simona concerning a statement made by the 
Department of Labor before this trial. The believability of a witness may be challenged by 
evidence that on some former occasion the witness made a statement that was not consistent with 
the witness' testimony in this case. Evidence of this kind may be considered by you only for the 
purpose of deciding whether you believe Ms. Simona's testimony and the weight to be given the 
testimony that you heard from the witness in this courtroom. This evidence of a statement by the 
Department of Labor has been admitted to help you decide if you believe Ms. Simona's 
testimony. You cannot use this statement as evidence in this case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
The testimony of Dr. Ronald Kristensen and Plaintiff's Exhibits 61 through 69 were 
admitted only for consideration in the claims of the Plaintiff against the Defendants Turner House 
and Larry Rogers. It is not to be considered for claims in the Third Party Complaint by Turner 
House, Larry Rogers, and Cheryl Barker against the Third Party Defendant Treasure Valley Area of 
Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous Literature. Whenever evidence is admitted for a 
limited purpose, you must not consider such evidence for any purpose other than the limited 





INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
These instructions explain your as jurors and define law that applies to this case. 
It is duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to those facts, 
to case. Your decision should be based upon a rational and objective 
assessment of the evidence. It should not be based on sympathy or prejudice. 
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it is your 
duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole, not picking 
out one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given or the manner in 
which they are numbered has no significance as to the importance of any of them. If you do not 
understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try to clarify or 
explain the point further. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This 
evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and any 
stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may help you 
understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they say is not evidence. If an attorney's 
argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you should disregard it. 
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial, I 
sustained an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it, or to an offered 
exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, and are solely my 
responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection, which was made, or my 
ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider such a question or exhibit or 
speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not 
evidence and should be considered only as it gives meaning to the answer. 
There were occasions where an objection was made after an answer was given or the 
remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I instructed that the answer or remark be 
stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your minds. In 
your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat it as though you 
had never heard it. 




Toe law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of the 
As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what 
weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience and 
background of ytmtlives. There is no magical formula for evaluating tesfuncmy. ,In your everyday 
affairs, you determine. for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how much weight 
you attach to what you are told. The considerations you use in making the more important 
decisions in your everyday dealings are the· same considerations you should apply in your 
deliberations in this case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
·, 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that 
directly proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact, by 
proving one or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred. 
Toe law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the 
degree of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is 
respected for such convincing force as it may carry. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions 
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into 






INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
The original instructions and the exhibits will be with you in the jury room. The original 
instructions and the exhibits are part of the official court record. For this reason please do not 
alter them or write or mark on them in any way. If you have any questions about the handling 
or use of the exhibits, submit those questions in writing to me through the bailiff. 
You will each receive a copy of the instructions. The copies will be presented to you in 
booklet form. Please do not write or mark any of the copies. 
The instructions are numbered for convenience in referring to specific instructions. There 
may or may not be a gap in the numbering of the instructions. If there is, you should not concern 






INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
following facts are not in dispute: . 
1. Turner House located at 105 North Second Street in Mountain Home, Idaho is . ~ 
owned by Defendant Larry Rogers who purchased the building in 2006. 
2. There is no elevator within Turner House; the :floors are connected by a series of 
stairways. 
3. Cheryl Barker is Mr. Rogers' sister. At all times.relevant she has been the general 
manager of Turner House for her brother. 
4. Prior to January 7, 2013, Ms. Barker entered into a lease agreement with Narcotics 
Anonymous for use of the third :floor meeting room. 
5. Bob Foss signed the lease on behalf of Narcotics Anonymous. 
6. There was no electricity to a light fixture at the second :floor landing. 
7. Ms. Barker and Mr. Rogers knew that the public was using the stairs to attend 
Narcotics Anonymous meetings on the third :floor of Turner House. 
8. Plaintiff Donna Simono attended Narcotics Anonymous meetings on the third floor 
of Turner House pursuant to a court order. 
9. Ms. Simona's medical treatment and associated costs of $47,215.00 were 
reasonable and necessary to treat her injuries and a summary of those medical costs 





INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the 
you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the 





INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the failure· to use 
ordinary care in the management of one's IJ!operty or person. The words "ordinary care" 
mean the ca.re a reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those 
shown by the evidence. Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a 
reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person 
would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. The law does 
not say how a reasonably careful person would act under those circumstances. That is for 
you to decide. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
It was the duty of all persons, before and at the time of the occurrence, to use ordinary care 
for the safety of themselves and each other. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
The owner and/or tenant owes a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid exposing persons on 
the premises to an unreasonable risk of harm. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 







INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
An invitee is a person who enters upon the premises of another for a purpose connected 
business there conducted, or whose visit may reasonably be said to co:n:fer or anticipate a 
business, commercial, monetary or other tangible benefit to the owner and/or tenant. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
An owner and/or tenant owes a duty of ordinary care under all the circumstances towards 
invitees who come upon the premises. This duty extends to all portions of the premises to which an 





INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
licensee is a person who goes upon the premises of another in 
purpose, with the consent of the owner and/or tenant. The consent of the owner and/or tenant may 
be implied from the circumstances under which the visitor enters the premises. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
The owner and/or tenant owes a duty to warn a licensee only of dangerous existing 
hazards on the land that were known to the owner and unknown to and not reasonably 






INSTRUCTION NO. 23 
A tenant having control of the premises is deemed, so far as third partt~s are concem~d, to 
the owner, and case of injury to third parties occasioned by the condition or use of the 





INSTRUCTION NO. 24 
The Plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. That Defendant Larry Rogers and/or 'Turner House was negligent; 
That Plaintiffwasinjured; 
3. The negligence of the Defendants Turner House and/or Larry Rogers was the 
proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff; and 
4. The elements of damage and amount thereof· 
You will be. asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
Question No. 2: Was there a breach of duty on the part of Defendant Larry Rogers and 
Turner House which was a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's damages? 
If you find from your consideration of all. the evidence that each of the propositions have 
been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, ify()µSmd that any of these 
propositions has not been proved, then the plaintiff has not met the burden of proof required and 
you should answer this question ''No." 
INSTRUCTION NO. 25 
In this case, the Defendants Larry Rogers and Turner House have alleged that the 
plaintiff was negligent. On this defense, the Defendant Larry Rogers· and Turner House 
have the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. The Plaintiff, Ms. Simono, was negligent. 
2. The negligence of the Plaintiff, Ms. Simino, was a proximate cause of her own 
injuries. 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
Question No. 5: Was there negligence on the part of the Plaintiff, Donna Simono, which was the 
proximate cause of the Plaintiff's damages? 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these 
propositions has been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find 
that any of these propositions has not been proved, then the defendant has not met the 






INSTRUCTION NO. 26 
The Third Party Plaintiffs haAe burdtjn of proof on each of the following propositions: 
That the Third Party Defe:ndant, Treasure Valley Area of Narcotics 
Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous literature was negligent; 
2. That the Thlrd Party :Plaintiffs I..arry Rogers, CherylBarker, and Turner 
House were injured; 
3. The negligence of the Defendants Treasure Valley Area of Narcotics 
Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous literature was the proximate cause· of the 
injury to the Third Party Plaintiff; and' 
4. The elements of damage and amount thereof. 
!I 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
Question No. 3: Was there a breach of duty on the part of Third Party Defendant Treasure Valley 
Area of Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous Literature which was a proximate cause 
of the Plaintiff's damages? 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions have 
been proved, you should answer this question«Yes." However, if you find that any of these 
propositions has not been proved, J'J~1h~intiff has not met the burden of proof required and 





INSTRUCTION NO. 27 
this case, the. Third Party Defendant Narcotics Anonymous has alleged that the Third 
Party Plaintiff was negligent. On this defense, the Third Party Defendants have the burden of proof 
on of the following propositions:· 
1. The Third Party Plaintiff was negligent. 
2. The negligence of Ms. Simono was a proximate cause of her own injuries. 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
Question No. 5: Was there negligence on the part of the Plaintiff, Donna Simona, which was the 
proximate cause of the Plaintiff's damages? 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these 
propositions has been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find 
. 1\,1,-.d~ 
that any of these propositions has not been proved, then the,.ctefendant has not met the 







INSTRUCTION NO. 28 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause that, in natural or probable 
""'r"'"''"""' produced the loss or the damage complained of. It need not the only cause. 
It is sufficient it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a 
proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway. 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent conduct of 
two or more persons or entities contributes concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about an 
injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to which 







INSTRUCfION NO. 29 
Third Party Plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following propositions on 
Party Claim of Breach Contract: 
1. contract existed between Third Party Plaintiffs Rogers, Barker and Turner House, and 
Third Party Defendant Narcotics Anonymous; 
2. The Third Party Defendant breached the contract; 
3. The Third Party Plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount of the damages. 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
Question No. 4: Was there a breach of contract on the part of Third-Party Defendant Treasure 
Valley Area of Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous Literature which was a proximate 
cause of the Plaintiff's damages? 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these 
propositions has been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find 
1lwd ~Pl~~+::,-
that any of these propositions has not been proved, then the d~ has not met the 







INSTRUCTION NO. 30 
The term"agent" to a per~on authorized by another, called the "principal/ to act for 
or in the place of the principal. The principal is responsible for any act of the agent within the 
agent's scope of authority. 
Both agent and principal are liable for acts by the agent, acting within the scope of authority 
for the principal, unless the identity of the principal and nature of the agency are known to the 
plaintiff at or before the time of the act in question. Where the identity ofthe principal and nature 







INSTRUCTION NO. 31 
In deciding this case, may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide any 
uvu,,ivu by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing straws. If money damages are to be 
awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not agree in advance to average the 
sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method of determining the amount of the damage 
award or percentage of negligence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 32 
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion 






INSTRUCTION NO. 33 
If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the Defendants Rogers and 
House, you must then determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly 
compensate the plaintiff for any damages proved to be proximately caused by the 
defendant's negligence. 
The elements of damage the jury may consider are: 
A. Non-economic damages 
· 1. The nature of the injuries; 
2. The physical and mental pain and suffering, past and future; 
3. The impairment of abilities to perform usual activities. 
B. Economic damages 
1. The reasonable value of necessary medical care received and expenses 
incurred as a result of the injury; 
Whether the plaintiff has proved any of these elements is for the jury to decide. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 34 
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the damage and 






INSTRUCTION NO. 35 
Under a standard table mortali% the life expe,ctancyof afemale ag~ is 84 years .. This 
figure is not conclusive; It is an actuarial estimate of the average probable remaining length of life 
based upon statistical samples of death rates and ages at death in this country. This data may be 
considered in connection with all other evidence relating to the probable life expectancy, including 








In this case you 
consists of a 
INSTRUCTION NO. 36 
be given a special verdict form to use in returning your verdict. This 
,--, - - - I , 
questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict form to you 





INSTRUCTION NO. 37 
retiring to the room, select one of your number as a foreperson, who will 
"'"''"u1,, over your deliberations. 
Appropriate forms of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Use 
only the ones conforming to your conclusions • 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. If your 
verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the 
entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict, you will notify the bailiff, 
who will then return you into open court. 
your number as a foreperson, who will 
preside over your deliberations. 
An appropriate form of verdic submitted to you with any instructions. 
Follow the directions on the verdict form, an answer all of the questions required of you by 
the instructions on the verdict form. 
/ 
urths of your number, or nine of you. As soon 
as nine or more of you shall have agreed p each of the required questions in the verdict, 
you should fill it out as instructed, and ave it igned. It is not necessary that the same nine 
agree on each question. If your verdi t is un · ous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if 
nine or more, but less than the entir jury, agree, en those so agreeing will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have com eted and signe the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff, 







INSTRUCTION NO. 39 
If i.t becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may 
send a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate 
with me by any means other than such a note. 
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on 
any of the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by me. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 401 
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you 
regarding matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In 
a few minutes counsel will present their closing arguments. to you and then you will retire to 
the jury room for your deliberations. 
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the 
attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the 
outset of deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of 
opinion on the case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the 
beginning, one's sense of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that 
position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, 
but you are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment 
and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the 
objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual 
judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a 






. INSTRUCTION NO. 41 
. YOU have llOW completed your° duties as]iiro~s fo this Case and ar~ discharged With 
the sincere thanks of this Court. You may now disetiss this case with the attorneys or with 
anyone else. For your guidance, I instruct you that whether you talk to the attorneys, or to 
anyone else, is entirely your own decision. It is proper for you to discuss this case, if you 
want to, but you are not required to do so, and you may·choose not to discuss the case with 
anyone at alL If you choose to talk to someone about this case, you may tell them as much 
or as little as you like about your deliberations or the facts that influenced your decisions. If 
anyone persists in discussing the case over your objection, or becomes critical of your 
service, either before or after any discussion has begun, you may report it to me. 
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Case No. CV-2013-209 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
MODIFIED OR NOT GIVEN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Attached hereto are the instructions discussed at the jury instruction conference which 
were NOT GIVEN to the jury in the above-captioned case. 
Dated: December .Jl..~4 




Certain evidence was just admitted for a limited purpose 
Whenever evidence is admitted a limited purpose, you must not consider such evidence for any 





















qualifications and credibility of the vr.tness ru.1:d the reasons given for the opinion. You are not 






These explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to this case. 
It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to those facts, 
and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be based upon a rational and objective 
assessment of the evidence. It should not be based on sympathy or prejudice. 
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it is your 
duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole, not picking 
out one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given or the manner in 
which they are numbered has no significance as to the importance of any of them. If you do not 
understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try to clarify or 
explain the point further. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This 
evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and any 
stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may help you 
understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they say is not evidence. If an attorney's 
argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you should disregard it. 
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial, I 
sustained an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it, or to an offered 
exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, and are solely my 
responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection, which was made, or my 
ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider such a question or exhibit or 
speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not 
evidence and should be considered only as it gives meaning to the answer. 
[There were occasions where an objection was made after an answer was given or the 
remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I instructed that the answer or remark 
be stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your 
minds. In your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat it 







The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of the 
As the sole judges the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what 
weight you attach to it. so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience and 
background of There is no magical formula for evaluating testimony. In your everyday 
affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how much weight 
you attach to what you are told. The considerations you use in making the more important 
decisions in your everyday dealings are the same considerations you should apply in your 
deliberations in this case. 
INSTRUCTION NO_ ~fjl~ 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. The lawy/.akes no distinction between 
direct and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a reasonaoff ethod of proof and each is 
respected for such convincing force as it may carry. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that 
directly proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact, by 
proving one or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred. 
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the 
degree of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is 
respected for such convincing force as it may carry. 
_Given 
_Modified 
\ .1.,4 J_Not given 
24 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions 
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into 
evidence and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings. 
. If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby ~ 
diverted from the 1Nitness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and cfa£U · 
not shovf them to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the trial. 
Old version 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The original instructions and the exhibits will be with you in the jury room. The original 
instructions and the exhibits are part of the official court record. For this reason please do not 
· n ,,.t.., tA 
alter them or write or mark on them in any way. [Some of the exhibit(s) have been sealed in bags ~ 
or containers that allow you to view them. Do not open or remove the contents of these ~ O~ 
exhibits.] If you have any questions about the handling or use of the exhibits, submit those 
questions in writing to me through the bailiff. 
You will each receive a copy of the instructions. The copies will be presented to you in 
booklet form. Please do not write or mark any of the copies. · 
The instructions are numbered for convenience in referring to specific instructions. There 
may or may not be a gap in the numbering of the instructions. If there is, you should not concern 







The following facts are not in dispute: 
Th~llowing facts are undisputed and to be taken as true: 
(2) Turner House located at 105 North Second Street in Mountain Home, Idaho is 
owned by Defendant Larry Rogers who purchased the building in 2006. 
2. Mr. Rogers has remodeled and currently is remodeling portions of Turner House, 
including retail businesses on the first floor, an apartment for Mr. Rogers' use on the 
second floor, and a meeting room for Third Party Defendant Narcotics Anonymous 
on the third floor. 
0 There is no elevator within Turner House; the floors are connected by a series of 
stairways. 
@ Cheryl Barker is Mr. Rogers' sister. At all times relevant she has been the general 
manager of Turner House for her brother. 
@Prior to January 7, 2013, Ms. Barker entered into a lease agreement with Narcotics 
Anonymous for g;:rc H'1aJ;r use of the third floor meeting room. 
~Bob Foss signed the lease on behalf ofNarcotics Anonymous. 
7. Mr. Foss facilitate~Narcotics Anonymous meetings on the third floor of Turner 
House in a semi-re deled area. He performs some maintenance for Turner House 
as per an agreeme · th Ms. Barker. 
~@ There;: no electricity to a light fixture at the lundmg ~~econd) 
floor ~ tt!Bter l:IoYH iB 3Q+3. 
9. Ms. 138.fltef !!lii4 Mr. Rogers knew th~ld light fixture above the second floor 
landing on the stairway of Turner Hou in existence prior to the time of Mr. 
Rogers' purchase of the building, co t be turned on due to no electrical 
connection to it. 
@is. Barker and Mr. Rogers knew that the public was using the stairs to attend 





@0n JBRl:ltlfY 7, 2Gl~, Plaintiff Donna Simono attended, enti d nd Narcotics 
Anonymous meeti'4n the thlrd fl or ofT urner House. pv-<su,,n,I- -it, co,,.\- c,YCIQ r", 
Ol'r'd&RlWli/i 1', iUi" '1, 'Zo 13 
When Ms. Simono left e me g, s e walked down the stairs from the third floor. 
While descending the s · from the top third floor down to the second floor 
landing she fell toward the ottom of the stairs onto the landing below. 
esult of the fall. She sustained fractures to her right 
ankle that required o opedic urgery in Boise, Idaho, and sprains to her left ankle. 
o.C $ 47, 21'5 
s. Simono's medical treatment and associated costs,..were reasonable and necessary 
treat her injuries and a summary of those medical costs and bills ~e admitted 
to evidence .. 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 
The Defendant Rogers ie that the lighting conditions on the stairs were adequate and 
there had never been any compl s to him about inadequate lighting since Narcotics 
Anonymous started holding me in there in early 2010. 
The Defendant Rogers a¥ts that he was not negligent, but rather, it was the negligence 






evidence on presumed facts 
facts undisputed 
-- GIVE 1.30.1 (Binding instruction) 
Instruction 1.30.l 
The following facts are undisputed and are to be taken as true: [insert facts established by 
presumption.] 
Comment: 
Rule 301 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence treats presumptions as shifting only the burden 
of producing evidence on the issue to the party opposing a presumption, unless a statute 
expressly provides for a different effect. Neither this instruction nor Instruction 125B purports to 
cover instances in which a statute is controlled. 
Where a presumption governed by IRE 301 is involved, the court should instruct as 
follows: 
1. Instruction 1.30.1 should be given when the basic facts which give rise to a 
presumption have been proved beyond reasonable dispute and no substantial evidence has been 
offered to disprove the fact established by the presumption, or when the fact to be proved by a 
presumption has otherwise been proved beyond reasonable dispute. 
Instruction 1.30.1 should be used when no substantial evidence has been introduced by 
either party concerning the existence of the presumed fact. 
3. Where substantial evidence of the nonexistence of the presumed fact has been 
presented by the party opposing the presumption, the presumption has been rebutted and 
disappears, the jury will decide the issue based on the evidence, and no instruction should be 
given. 
4. Where insufficient evidence has been presented to permit the jury to fmd that the basic 







In this case, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. I called your attention to 
when the evidence was admitted. I remind you that whenever evidence was admitted for a 
limited purpose, you must not consider such evidence for any purpose other than the limited 
purpose for which it was admitted. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Whether a party has insurance is not relevant to any of the questions you are to 
decide. You must avoid any inference, speculation or discussion about insurance. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the 
expression "if you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the 
-








IDJI 220 Definition of negligence; Unmodified; Requested by Plaintiff anci Third P 
Oe M. · 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the failure to use 
ordinary care in the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care" 
mean the care a reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those 
shown by the evidence. Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a 
reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person 
would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. ffie law does ( ~ . 
That is for 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The words ''willful and wanton" when used in these instructions and when applied to the 
allegations in this case, mean more than ordinary negligence. The words mean intentional or ~ 
reckless actions, taken under circumstances where the actor knew or should have known that the 
actions not only created an unreasonable risk of harm to another, but involved a high degree of 
probability that such harm would actually result. 
Comment: 
There appears to be no distinction between "reckless" and "willful and wanton" or 
"willful or wanton." Hunter v. Horton, 80 Idaho 475,479, 333 P.2d 459 (1958); Johnson 
v. Sunshine Mining Co., Inc., 106 Idaho 866, 873, P.2d 268 (1984); DeGroffv. Wight, 
130 Idaho 557, 944 P.2d 712 (1997). 
Given 
-1.· 'U)Modified 




It was the duty all parties persons, ind~eg; tke Eain.tiff ~4~. ~imoao5 De:fuudaot R Qget:51, 
and 'Thtfd Pflfty Defendant ~~meotics ktonmmas, before and at the time of the occurre~ce, to use ~ 




You are to accept as a fact that ____ was exercising ordinary care at the time of and __:J.-_.... 
immediately before the accident. 
Comment: 
Use this instruction where there is no evidence on the issue of due care. If there is 
sufficient evidence on the issue, the presumption evaporates and no special instruction should be 
given at all. Idaho Rule of Evidence 301; see also, IDJI2d 130 and comment. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
{4:Pp":lo-(" 
The negligence, if any, of the defendant name 
NPr 
[any other defendant] [the defendant (name) ]. 
Given 
1,. 00•'? Modified 




INSTRUCTION NO. \/ 
fowner] [occupant] owes a duty not to cause intentional or ~kless harm to persons or 
property on the premises. 
1NSTRUCI10NNO. \~ 
oJd/ov.\e~an~ ~-
ThekwnerJ [QC.CUpi«] owes a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid exposing persons on 
premises to an unreasonable risk of harm. 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
The {owner] [occupant] owes a duty to fix or warn of any dangerous or defective condition 
known to the {owner] [occupant], or v,hich, in the t*ercise of ordinary care, should hEP,'e been 
discovered. 
INSTRUCTION NO. --I-
If an [owner's] [occupant's] employee creates a ~/erous or defective condition, or has 
knowledge ofit, the [owner] [occupant] is deemed to have kn~edge of it as a matter oflaw. 
v-' l}tJ row'f\ 
Given 
7Modified 





An [ov,'ller],Joccupantf owes a duty of ordinary care under all the circumstances towards 
invitees who come upon the premises. This duty extends to all portions of the premises to which an 
invitee may reasonably be expected to go. 
The [owner] [occupant] owes a duty to exercise ord' care in inspection of the premises 
for the purpose of discovering dangerous conditions. 
\p~~ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
An invitee is a person who enters upon the premises of another for a purpose connected 
with business there conducted, or whose visit may reasonably be said to confer or anticipate a 
business, commercial, monetary or other tangible benefit to the [owner] [occupant}. 
::::> 
I0Il3JS-Dµtyto ali 
~:J(o, -ltt1~~ INSTRUCTION NO. 
The owner~owes a duty to warn a licensee only of dangerous existing hazards on the land 
that were known to the owner and unknown to and not reasonably discoverable by the licensee. 
Comment: 
"Reckless" appears to be the equivalent of "viillful and v.ranton," and is more 








licensee is a person who goes upon the premises of another in pursuit of the visitor's 
purpose, with the consent of the [owner] [occupant] owner or occupant. The consent of the [owner] 
[ occupant] owner or occupant may be implied from the circumstances under which the visitor 
enters the premises. 
Comment: 
See, Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 871 P.2d 814 (1994). 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
is only required to share with the licensee knowledge of dangero 
land. 
Ball v. City of Blaclifoot, 152 Idaho 673,677,273 P.3d 1266, 1270 (2012) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Tenants owe a duty of ordinary care under all circumstanc~ward invitees who come 
upon the premises. 
Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989) 
Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 126 Idaho 316, 882 P.2d 971 (1994). 
Given 
1.1~.1 Modified 




a reasonably safe condition for its invitees even though 
Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 126 Idaho 316,882 P.2d 971 (1994). 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A tenant cannot, the terms of the lease, be discharged from the duty to its guests or 
Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 126 Idaho 316, 882 P.2d 971 (1994). 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A tenant having control of the premises is deemed, so far as third parties are concerned, to 
be the owner, and in case of injury to third parties occasioned by the condition or use of the 
premises, the general rule is that the tenant may be liable for failure to keep the premises in repair. 
Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989) 
b)\\,lw\ Given 
_Modified 




tenant, but not the owner is liable injuries to 
use of the premises so far, at least, as they were under his co tr 1. A tenant having control over the 
demised premises is deemed, so far as third parties or the pub are concerned, to be the owner, and 
in cases of injuries to third parties, occasioned by the conditi n use of the premises, it is a general 
rule, prima facie, breach of duty and therefore the liability is that of the tenant and not that of the 
owner. 
Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The owner owes a duty to warn a licensee only of dJ ous existing hazards on the land 
that were known to the owner and unknown f and not reasonabl~ ·scoverable by the licensee. 








On the issue of , th ---- ---+---- has the burden proof on each of the 
propositions: 
ultimate fact or conclusion to be proved, not specific 
facts, in concise format. Use numbered 
You will be asked the following question n e jury verdict form: 
(Insert the exact jury interrogato on th issue). 
If you find from your consideration 
contained in this instruction has bee proved, you should answer the jury question ''yes." If you 
find that any of these propositions has not been proved, you should answer the question "no." 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The Plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
lat~ ~,s and{0Yl'uffllt"l-\o11sc.. 
1. That Defendant was negligent; 
2. That Plaintiff was injured; _ .. .1i :-n. IL, . ...,, 
(.2)~ ~rs -,(J( '"''\\A.n-.-
3. The negligence of the Qefendantwas the proximate cause of the injury to tl1e 
plaintiff; and 
4. The elements of damage and amount thereof 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
1w~ the defendant negligent, and if so, was the defendant's negligence a proximate cause of 
~am-ages to the plaintiff? 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions have 
been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find that any of these 
propositions has not been proved, then the plaintiff has not met the burden of proof required and 







this case, the defendant has alleged that the plaintiff was negligent. On this 
defense, the defendant has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. The plaintiff was negligent. 
2. The negligence of the plaintiff was a proximate cause of [his/her] own injuries. 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
~ the plaintiff negligent, and if so was the plaintiff's negligence a proximate ) 
~e of [his/her] injuries? 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has 
been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find that any of these 
propositions has not been proved, then the defendant has not met the burden of proof 
required and you should answer this question "No." 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In this case, the Defendant Rogers and Third-Party Defendant Narcotics Anonymous have 
~ r«J. \'.e(~ 3",.P 
alleged that the ,laintiff was negligent. On this defense, the \lefendants have the burden of proof on 
each of the following propositions: 
1. The plaintiff was negligent. 
2. The negligence of Ms. Simono was a proximate cause of her own injuries. 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
~ the plamtiff Donna Simona negligent, and if so was the plaintiff's negligence > 
~oximate cause of her injuries?" 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has 
been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find that any of these 
propositions has not been proved, then the defendant has not met the burden of proof 







When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause that, in natural or probable 
sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage complained 0£ It need not be the only cause. 
It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a 
proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway. 
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent conduct of 
two or more persons or entities contributes concurrently as substantial factors in brin.gfag about an 
injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to which 
each contributes to the injury. 
NNO. 
You must decide from the evidenc if ogers knew, or by the exercise of reasonable 
care should have known, of the existence o 
Rogers must have had either actual constructive notice of a dangerous condition 
in order to establish a breach of the duty o c 







person fails to exercise ordinary care for her own safety when she does something 
to something under circumstances in which a reasonable person would foresee 
that by her action or failure to act, she will subject a person or property to an unreasonable 
risk of injury or damage. Thus, when a reasonable person knows or should know that a 
course of conduct poses substantial, inherent risks, yet the person persists in the conduct 
voluntarily and suffers injury as result, the person will not be permitted to recover from 
someone who is less negligent. 
If you find that Ms. Simono engaged in conduct that contributed to her iPJury, you 







Rogers and Barker have burden of proving each of the 
1. A contract existed between Rogers and Barker and Narcotics Anonymous; 
2. Narcotics Anonymous breached the contract; 
3. Rogers and Barker have been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount of the damages. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions 
required of Rogers and Barker has been proved, then you must consider the issue of the 
affirmative defenses raised by Narcotics Anonymous. If you find from your consideration of all 
the evidence that any of the propositions in this instruction has not been proved, your verdict 
should be for Narcotics Anonymous on the breach of contract claim. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ~,A~~r-* 
The p~has the burden of proving each of the following propositions: 
l'n\'d~ -tt,l'O p,l.f 
1. A contract existed between plaintiff and defendant; 
$1f'O~~ 
2. The defel).d,ant breached the contract; 
~~Qe"'11 
3. The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. Tue amount of the daniages. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions required 
of the p~tiff has been proved, then you must consider the iss~f the affirmative defenses raised 
by th~efen~ and explained in the next instruction. If yo/~ from your consideration of all 
the evidence th~t :piy of the propositions in this instruction has not been proved, your verdict should 
»,.'(Ii~ . 







contract is an agreement between two or more parties to or not do something that is 
supported by consideration. 
There are four elements to complete a contract. Every contract must have these four 
elements. The four elements are: 
I. Competent parties; 
2. A lawful purpose; 
3. Valid consideration; and 
4. Mutual agreement by all parties to all essential terms. 






Note: The court must first decide whether determination of the intent of the parties is properly a 
issue. If it is not, obviously the instruction would not be given. Should the court determine 
is properly before the jury, the following instruction may be appropriate: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The terms of the contract are in dispute as to the following provisions: 
1. Tenant may make no alteration to premises without owner's permission . 
2. Tenant will replace all inoperative lightbulbs or tubes, as needed. 
3. Tenant agrees to maintain premises in neat and clean condition. Maintain all 
furnishings in good condition, aliowing for reasonable wear. 
You must determine what was intended by the parties as evidenced by the contract in this 
case. In making this determination you should consider, from the evidence, the following: 
1. The contract must be construed as a whole, including all of the circumstances giving 
rise to it, to give consistent meaning to every part of it. 
2. Language must be given its ordinary meaning, unless you find from the evidence 
that a special meaning was intended. 
3. Any communications, conduct or dealings between the contracting parties showing 
what they intended and how they construed the doubtful language may be considered, provided that 
such may not completely change the agreement or construe one term inconsistently with the 
remainder of the terms. 
The eontract should be eonstrued to avoid any contradiction or abSllfditie& 
[Persons within a specialized field are deemed to have contracted with reference to any 
generally knovm and customarily accepted language in that field, unless you find from the evidence 






may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the contract offered by any 
witness, or any oral agreement of the parties occurring before execution of the written agreement, 
which is inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of the written agreement. While you may 
consider the testimony of witnesses if necessary to clarify an ambiguity, you may not consider such 
testimony to completely change the agreement, or to construe a term of the agreement in such a 
fashion that it no longer fits with the other, non-ambiguous terms or parts. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Where there is ambiguous language in a contract, and where the true intent of the parties 
cannot be ascertained by any other evidence, the ambiguity can be resolved by interpreting the 
contract against the party who drafted the contract or provided the ambiguous language. VJ )\,h..ct ~ · 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 
A contract may be written or oral, or may contain both written terms and oral terms. So 
long as all the required elements are present, it makes no different whether the agreement is in 
writing. w l ~ vcJ.)l '() 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 








A "material breach of contract," as that term is used in these instructions, means a breach 
that defeats a fundamental purpose of the contract. 
I Ervin Const. v. Van Onle,'i, 125 Id. 695, 699 (1993) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
When a contract expresses no specific time for its performance, the law implies that it is to 
be performed within a reasonable time, as determined by the subject matter of the contract, the 
situation of the parties, and the circumstances attending the performance. If you find a contract 
exists in this case, you are to determine what a reasonable time would be for the performance of this 
contract under these circumstances. 
Comment: 
See Cur:?on v. Wells Cargo, Jnc., 86 Idaho 38,382 P.2d 906; Irvine v. Perry, 78 Idaho 132,299 







case the defendant has asserted certain affirmative defe The defendant has the 
burden of proof on each of the affirmative defenses asserted. 
[Insert the specific affirmative defense elements applicable the defendant's claims.] 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence th e ch of the propositions required 
of the defendant has been proved, then your verdict should be cfi the efense. If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any of the proposik'ons has not been proved, then the 
defendant has not proved the affirmative defense in this case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The defendant has asserted the defense of prevention of 
defendant's performance of the contract. If this affirmative d fens is proved, the defendant is 
excused from performance. 
Comment: 
Sullivan v. Bullock, 124 Idaho 738, 742-743n.2 (Ct. App. 1993); Fergerson v. City of 
Orofino, 131 Idaho 190, 193, (Ct. App. 1998) 
_Given 
_ l\jlod ified 
.JL'.Not given 
50 
.., ... , ... .,,v,,, Impossibility as a defense will invariably be based upon a specific fact circumstance. 
pattern instruction focuses on the elements of the defense rather than on attempt to 
catalog the circumstances giving rise to it. In the ordinary case, it may be to include 
aa<Jmomil instructions addressing the specific circumstances of the case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In this case, the defendant has claimed the defense of impossibility because of the follov.,ing 
circumstance: 
[Insert description of circumstance, such as death of essential participant, destruction of 
essential property, unforeseen change oflaw, act of God, etc.] 
In order for this defense to apply, the defendant has the burden of proof on each of the following: 
1. no fault of the 
defendant. 
2. The happening of this circumstance could not reasonably h v 
the defendant when the contract was entered into. 
3. The happening of this circumstance was not 
responsibility of any party by the contract itself. 
4. · The happening of this circumstance prevents the perform 
essential and important terms. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case that each of the foregoing 
propositions has been proved, your verdict should be for the defendant. If you find that any of the 








this case that Cheryl Barker was the agent of the principal, 
Rogers, at the time of the transaction described by the evidence. Therefore, Larry Rogers, the 









deciding this case, may not delegate any your decisions to another or decide any 
question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages are to be 
awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not agree in advance to average the 
sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method of determining the amount of the damage 
award or percentage of negligence. 
('O ob) l • 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion , 
.,,()ch\. 







- ~(S;;,nd IV!l'b' 
the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the ~efendan:Q you must 
then determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff 
for any damages proved to be proximately caused by the defendant's negligence. 
The elements of damage the jury may consider are: 
A. Non-economic damages 
I. The nature of the injuries; 
2. The physical and mental pain and suffering, past and future; 
3. The impairment of abilities to perform usual activities. 
B. Economic damages 
1. The reasonable value of necessary medical care received and expenses 
incurred as a result of the iajury ($+.:,2 U); 




If the jury decides the plcrinti:# is entitled to cover from e~ defendant/, the 
jury must dete1111llle the amount ofmo ey that will r asonably and fairly corate tet1~ 
for any damages proved to be proximate caused b the negligence of suet' de~t(i). 
The elements of damage the jury 
A. Non-economic damages 
I. The nature of the injuries; 
2. The physical and mental pain suffering, past and future; 
3. The impairment of abilities t 
B. Economic damages 
1. The reasonable v 






When I use the term "value" or the phrase "fair ark value" in these fastructions as 
services rendered, I mean the amount of money that a wil · employer would pay and a willing r:::! ,1J 
employee would accept for the services in question, under i umstances as existed immediately ~ 
prior to the occurrence in question, in an open marketplace. 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the damage and [) ~ 
prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such care cannot be 
recovered. 
INSTRUCTION NUMBl/ 
Damages must be proven with reasonable certainty. r existence and extent of damages 
cannot be left to speculation. W ~d.~ -'-
Anderson v. Nafziger v. GT Newcomb, Inc., 
100 Idaho 175,595 P.2d 709 (1979) 







Under a standard table of mortality, the life expectancy of a female age 49 is~ years. 
figure is not conclusive. It is an actuarial estimate of the average probable remaining length of 
life based upon statistical samples of death rates and ages at death in this country. This data may be 
considered in connection with all other evidence relating to the probable life expectancy, including 








If the jury decides the.plaintiff is entitled to recover from the .defendant, the jury ~t/ 
' ~ ~ ~~~J~ 
determine the amount of money that will reasonable and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any of 
-H11rtJ f.&(O'lJ 
the following elements of damages proved by the evidence to have resulted from theieefendant' s 
breach of contract: 
[Insert the elements of damage that have a basis in the evidence 1/ 
.,, 




G l l 
57 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
On the issue of negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of proving to prove each of the 
following propositions: 
1. A duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendants to conform to a certain standard of 
conduct; 
2. A breach of that duty; 
3. A causal connection between the conduct of the Defendant Rogers and Third-Party 
Defendant Narcotics Anonymous and the resulting injuries to plaintiff Ms. Si.mono; and 
4. Actual loss or damage. 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
Was there negligence on the part of the Defendant Rogers and Third-Party Defendant Narcotics 
Anonymous, which was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages? 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions 
contained in this instruction has been proved, then you should answer the jury question "yes." If 









form consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict form to you 
now. 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 
In this case you will return a special verdict, consisting of a series of questions which you 
should answer. In answering each question you must be persuaded, considering all the evidence 
in the case, that your choice of answers is more probably true than not true. 
We, the Jury, answer the questions submitted to us in the Special Verdict as follows: 
We, the Jury, answer the special interro_gatories as follows: . 0 0 " .)0"\\~,, -z...ol'a · (Siu.a~ l',)c) ..1.: Wha.} ums. .\-k.4 S'\imA,s of Donna '&1""c:u, ~ {1'2.4t1-',ii;.2L. 
P.s ,It) "f'i> f1\f., ""'5" -c ~ uq,, .s '"' ...ike l!CQll5'C. 51 y'\,,. '¥7'\ As 1tl NA 1Y1 J 
~estion No. 1: Was there negligence on the part of Defendant Larry Rogers which was a 
{ proximate cause of the Plaintiff's damages? 
Answer to Question No.1: Yes L_J No L_J 
Proceed to Question No. 2. 
Question No. 2: Was there negligence on the part of Third-Party Defendant Treasure Valley Area 
of Narcotics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous Literature which was a proximate cause of the 
Plaintiff's damages? 
Answer to Question No. 2: Yes L_J No L_J 
If your answers to both Questions No. 1 and 2 are ''No," do not answer any further questions. 
Simply sign the verdict and advise the Bailiff. If your answer to either or both of Questions No. I 
and 2 is "Yes," proceed to Question No. 3. 
~ .l,k'l'Q. a, '()N!zo. ot K . 
Question No. 3: Was there negligence on the part of the Plaintiff, Donna Simono, which was the 





proximate cause of the Plaintiff's damages? 
Answer to Question No. 3: Yes .___. 
Proceed to Question No. 
Question No. 4: You are now to apportion the fault of the parties in terms of a percentage. Insert 
the percentage of negligence of each party, if any, which was a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's 
damages. Your percentages must total 100%. 
a) Plaintiff Donna Simono % 
b) Defendant Larry Rogers % 
c) Third-Party Defendant Narcotics Anonymous _____ % 
Proceed to Question No. 5. 
Question No. 5: We assess the Plaintiff's damages as follows: 
a) Economic Damages $ ____ _ 
b) Non-Economic Damages $ ____ _ 








On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a :S,, who will 
preside over your deliberations. 
Appropriate forms of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Use 
only the ones conforming to your conclusions and return the others unused. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. If your 
verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the 
entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing ·will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict, you will notify the bailiff, 
who will then return you into open court. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as ~' who will 
preside over your deliberations. 
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. 
Follow the directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you by 
the instructions on the verdict form. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon 
as nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the verdict, 
you should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the same nine 
agree on each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if 
nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff, 





. ,\- ,' '.,. ,', 
' --,. -. l 
If it becomes necessary during yoµr delibe:ratfons to communicate with me, you may 
send a note signed by one or more of you to 'the bailiff. You should not try to communicate 
with me by any means other than such a note. 
During your deliberations, yo1,1. are :not to rev~al to anyone how the jury stands on 
-- l -- ,_ • ' ' ' 
any of the questions before you, ~umerically or otherwise, unless Iequested to do so by me. 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you 
regarding matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In (\ 
0 
c) bj • 
a few minutes counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to 
the jury room for your deliberations. 
Each of you. has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the 
attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the . 
outset of deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of 
opinion on the case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the 
beginning, one's scnsr:: of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to chai."lge that 
position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, 
but you are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment 
and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the 
objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual 
judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a 
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